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BEYOND CONTROL?:  THE RISE AND FALL OF 
DEFAMATION REGULATION ON THE 
INTERNET 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord, 
Is the immediate jewel of their souls. 
Who steals my purse, steals trash; ’tis something, 
nothing, 
’Twas mine, ’tis his, and has been slave to thousands: 
But he that filches from me my good name 
Robs me of that which not enriches him 
And makes me poor indeed.1 
 
“Have you seen this?”2  This was the subject of an e-mail message 
received by a female law student from another classmate one afternoon, 
and as the classmate was speculative as to its contents, she decided to 
open the intriguing message.  Inside the message contained a link to a 
contest for “The ‘Most Appealing’ Women @ Top Law Schools.”  
However, what lay beneath this catchy title was anything but appealing; 
the site displayed three personal pictures of this particular law student.  
The first two were from her friend’s fashion show and the other of her at 
a beach in Santorini wearing only a bathing suit.  The caption beneath 
the picture read “[f]or a self-proclaimed feminist, [Jane Doe] loves 
objectifying herself in front of cameras.  I guess it’s empowerment when 
she does it, and exploitation when others do it, because she is in law 
school.”  While she did not consent to being entered into this 
demoralizing contest, the law student had posted her pictures on 
websites like Flickr, Facebook, YouTube, MySpace, and Friendster—
something that she later lamented.3  This simple task is certainly not 
unusual.  In fact, most of her friends posted similarly personal pictures 
on the same or similar sites but were not subject to the scorn that 
overshadowed this particular law student. 
With little other recourse, the law student e-mailed the website 
coordinators and asked to be removed from the competition, but there 
was no response.  Later, a message appeared on the website stating the 
pictures would not be taken down until after the competition.  Again, the 
                                                 
1 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3. 
2  This hypothetical is completely fictional and entirely the creation of the author.  Any 
resemblance to real persons or facts is coincidental. 
3 See infra note 28 (discussing these and other websites that allow users to post and 
share their pictures). 
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law student made a request of the coordinators to take down the 
material—again, no response.  Indeed, it seemed that all her requests 
generated was retaliation by hosts and users posting nasty comments 
about the women and speculating as to their promiscuity.  The 
comments included, “i would like to [expletive deleted] [Jane Doe] but 
since people say she has herpes that might be a bad idea[,]” and the site 
attacked the reputations of a number of female law students, solely so 
that a bunch of Internet spectators could vote on their favorite 
“CGWBT,” shorthand for “cheerful girl with big tits[.]”4  Within days, 
the contest generated nearly 2,000 hits on Google.5 
Over the years, the Internet has transformed into something much 
different than its bulletin board predecessors.6  It is no longer merely a 
facet of computing technology; today, it is a part of entertainment, 
consumer spending, and popular culture.7  The Internet has fused 
                                                 
4 Posting of Patterico to Patterico's Pontifications, http://patterico.com/2007/06/13/ 
volokh-on-the-autoadmit-lawsuit/ (June 13, 2007, 6:01).  This quote was extracted to prove 
the degree of insult that can be found online.  See id. 
5 See Posting of Jill Filipovic to Feministe, http://www.feministe.us/blog/archives/ 
2007/03/07/wapo-calls-out-law-school-pervs/ (Mar. 7, 2007).  See also Posting of 
DavidRosen to AutoAdmit, http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=643868& 
forum_id=2#8243886 (June 11, 2007, 20:38) (the attorney bringing the lawsuit posted a 
summons on the AutoAdmit website under the user name DavidRosen).  This introduction 
closely traces the facts alleged by a defamed law student, and are the subject of a complaint 
filed June 11, 2007 in the U.S. District Court in Connecticut by two other law students 
defamed on the same website.  Id.  The suit, filed by two female law students, named as 
defendants Anthony Ciolli, a former director of the website, and a number of other users 
who posted the students’ photos as well as defamatory and threatening remarks about 
them on the AutoAdmit law school discussion forum.  Id.  The lawsuit sought more than 
$200,000 in punitive damages for defamation and demanded the offensive postings be 
taken down.  Posting of Amir Efrati to Law Blog, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/06/12/ 
students-file-suit-against-autoadmit-director-others/ (June 12, 2007, 11:42).  As a result of 
this lawsuit, Anthony Ciolli will be forced to realize the real-world consequence of Internet 
defamation because his post-graduation job offer has been rescinded as a direct result of his 
involvement in the AutoAdmit scandal.  Id.  In March 2009, Portfolio Magazine published 
an update to this cyber-bullying lawsuit.  David Margolick, Slimed Online, Portfolio 
Magazine, http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/national-news/portfolio/2009/02/ 
11/Two-Lawyers-Fight-Cyber-Bullying (discussing the lawsuit and defendants that have 
been charged to date). 
6 See infra Part II.A and accompanying text (discussing the transition for bulletin boards 
to online web journals). 
7 See, e.g., Pew Internet & American Life Project, Reports:  Online Activities & Pursuits, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/c/1/topics.asp (last visited Nov. 8, 2007).  This study 
reports the most popular internet uses, including but not limited to, video-sharing, 
information searches, web journals, hobbies, online video and pictures, and social 
networking sites.  Id.  For example, the study reports that “[m]ore than half (55%) of all 
online American youths ages 12–17 use online social networking sites.”  Id.  And, perhaps 
even more startlingly, the study reports that 28% of teens have their own web journal, more 
commonly referred to as a “blog.”  Id. 
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analytical computing with the mainstream social life in America.8  
Moreover, the ability of users to access the Internet has increased.9  The 
Internet no longer requires technical computing language to navigate 
effectively; instead, the Internet is provided by the mere click of a mouse, 
and widespread broadband Internet access allows virtually anyone to 
become a publisher.10 
This increased freedom has given way to new forms of publication, 
including weblogs, or “blogs[,]” typically produced by individuals as 
merely a pastime, or increasingly more common, as an income yielding, 
self-made enterprise.11  Collectively, the blogs comprise the 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., JOHN HORRIGAN & LEE RAINIE, THE INTERNET’S GROWING ROLE IN LIFE’S 
MAJOR MOMENTS (Apr. 19, 2006), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/ 
PIP_Major%20Moments_2006.pdf.  This study reports that the Internet developed as an 
important medium to individuals’ everyday lives.  Id.  In fact, “[t]he proportion of 
Americans online on a typical day grew from 36% of the entire adult population in January 
2002 to 44% in December 2005.”  Id. at 1.  Likewise, “[t]he number of adults who 
[reportedly] said they logged on at least once a day from home rose from 27% of American 
adults in January 2002 to 35% in late 2005.”  Id.  Moreover, for many Internet users “the 
[I]nternet has become a crucial source of information . . .  fully 45% of [I]nternet users, or 
about 60 million Americans, say that the [I]nternet helped them make big decisions or 
negotiate their way through major episodes in their lives in the previous two years.”  Id. 
9 See, e.g., JOHN HORRIGAN, HOME BROADBAND ADOPTION 2006, Pew Internet & 
American Life Project (May 28, 2006), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/ 
PIP_Broadband_trends2006.pdf.  The number of Americans with broadband Internet access 
in their homes increased from 60 to 84 million between March 2005 and March 2006.  Id. at 
i.  In addition, the study reports that 48 million Americans have posted content on the 
Internet.  Id. at ii.  Broadband Internet adoption also increased by 14% over the 2006 
numbers, as reported in a 2007 update report.  See JOHN HORRIGAN & AARON SMITH, HOME 
BROADBAND ADOPTION 2007, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT (Jul. 3, 2007), 
available at  http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Broadband%202007.pdf. 
10 See, e.g., JOHN B. HORRIGAN, A TYPOLOGY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION 
TECHNOLOGY USERS, Pew Internet & American Life Project (May, 7, 2007), available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_ICT_Typology.pdf.  This study explains that 
more than half of Americans regularly used the Internet or engaged devices that connect to 
the Internet, and it further describes a broad spectrum of Internet users including:  the most 
active users termed “Web 2.0 users,” less active users that appreciate Internet devices but 
own relatively few, and the least active users that are satisfied using very few Internet 
devices.  Id. at i.   The term Web 2.0 is instructive in any discussion of the history of the 
Internet and is often used to describe users or ideas at the forefront of innovation.  See Tim 
O’Reilly, O’Reilly—What Is Web 2.0 (Sept. 30, 2005), http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/ 
oreilly/tim/news/2005/09/30/what-is-web-20.html.  Web 2.0 is a term that was created 
during a brainstorming session after the crash of the Internet when Internet advocates 
feared that there would not be an adoption of the Internet by everyday consumers.  Id.  
Web 2.0 replaced the double-clicking, directory based “sticking” feel with a new interactive 
approach that led to Google, Wikipedia, and other more seamless web applications.  Id. 
11 See Stephen Baker & Heather Green, Blogs Will Change Your Business, BUSINESS WEEK 
56, May 2, 2005, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_18/ 
b3931001_mz001.htm.  This article boldly states that Internet users should not turn their 
heads to the influence of blogs:  “you cannot afford to close your eyes to them, because 
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“blogosphere[,]” and in much the same way a small leak can become a 
flood, the collective power of the blogosphere can likewise have a 
tremendous impact.12 
As with all emerging media, the Internet has experienced its fair 
share of growing pains, as legislatures and the law struggle to keep 
pace.13  Despite the increasing number of publishers, a majority of the 
recent legislation drafted by Congress to regulate or potentially stifle 
online speech has misunderstood, or largely ignored, the speed of 
technology that has given new life to the threat defamation poses on the 
Internet.14  Moreover, while many of the present problems facing the 
Internet have existed since its inception, it was not until 1995 that the 
first law review article appeared with “[d]efamation” and “Internet” in 
                                                                                                             
they’re simply the most explosive outbreak in the information world since the Internet 
itself.”  Id.  Moreover, the article accurately describes the transformation from printing 
presses to blogs, noting the extremely low barriers to entry that make this new form of 
publication so incredibly influential.  Id. 
12 Id.  This article concludes its discussion of mass media by stating as follows: 
The printing press set the model for mass media. A lucky handful 
owns the publishing machinery and controls the information.  
Whether at newspapers or global manufacturing giants, they decide 
what the masses will learn.  This elite still holds sway at most 
companies.  You know them.  They generally park in sheltered spaces, 
have longer rides on elevators, and avoid the cafeteria.  They keep the 
secrets safe and coif the company’s message.  Then they distribute it -- 
usually on a need-to-know basis -- to customers, employees, investors, 
and the press. 
That’s the world of mass media, and the blogs are turning it on its 
head.  Set up a free account at Blogger or other blog services, and you 
see right away that the cost of publishing has fallen practically to zero.  
Any dolt with a working computer and an Internet connection can 
become a blog publisher in the 10 minutes it takes to sign up. 
Sure, most blogs are painfully primitive.  That’s not the point.  They 
represent power.  Look at it this way:  In the age of mass media, 
publications like ours print the news.  Sources try to get quoted, but 
the decision is ours.  Ditto with letters to the editor.  Now instead of 
just speaking through us, they can blog.  And if they master the ins 
and outs of this new art -- like how to get other bloggers to link to 
them -- they reach a huge audience. 
Id. 
13 See infra Part II.A (discussing the implications and criticisms of regulation on the 
Internet in recent years). 
14 See infra note 30; see also Cynthia L. Counts & C. Amanda Martin, Libel in Cyberspace:  A 
Framework for Addressing Liability and Jurisdictional Issues in This New Frontier, 59 ALBANY L. 
REV. 1083 (1996); Paul R. Niehaus, Comment, Cyberlibel:  Workable Liability Standards?, 1996 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 617 (1996); C. Waelde & L. Edwards, Defamation and the Internet:  A Case 
Study of Anomalies and Difficulties in the Information Age, 10 INT’L REVIEW OF LAW COMPUTERS 
& TECH. 263 (1996). 
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its title.15  Although Congress has made some attempt to protect Internet 
users and shift liability for defamatory acts, little change has actually 
occurred, and many of the underlying concepts behind the intended 
progress are conclusively unsound.16 
To deal with the speed of cyberspace, legislatures and courts are 
often faced with three conflicting methods:  the first, to proceed leniently 
allowing the technology to develop its own self-regulation; the second, 
to proceed definitively through the development of cyberlaws that 
establish order ahead of technology; and, the third, to proceed 
cautiously, applying pre-existing laws, so that they might better 
understand cyberspace before enacting more comprehensive 
regulations.17  Among these conflicting methods, both the courts and 
                                                 
15 See Thomas D. Brooks, Note, Catching Jellyfish in the Internet:  The Public-Figure Doctrine 
and Defamation on Computer Bulletin Boards, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 461 (1995) 
(located through a search of Westlaw’s database of “Journals and Law Reviews Combined” 
(JLR) in January 2008 for article titles which include “defamation” and “Internet”). 
16 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).  Justice 
Stevens, writing for the majority in the affirmed decision, included observations of the 
three-judge district court panel to conclude that the Internet was a unique mode of 
communication.  Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997).  More specifically, Judge Datzell, 
the District Court Judge, after examining the extensive findings of fact before the court, 
described the Internet as unique for a number of reasons: 
First, the Internet presents very low barriers to entry.  Second, these 
barriers to entry are identical for both speakers and listeners.  Third, as 
a result of these low barriers, astoundingly diverse content is available 
on the Internet.  Fourth, the Internet provides significant access to all 
who wish to speak in the medium, and even creates a relative parity 
among the speakers. 
Reno, 929 F. Supp at 877.  In fact, the concept of a unique Internet environment acted as an 
undercurrent throughout much of Stevens’s opinion, and assisted in characterizing the 
Internet has wholly unique from other forms of broadcast media.  See Reno, 521 U.S. at 867.  
However, the Court recognized that some of its prior decisions were predicated on special 
justifications for regulating broadcast media that may be inapplicable for other types of 
speakers.  Id. at 868.  Moreover, Stevens distinguished FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 
726 (1978), by stating that the FCC had “decades” of experience in regulating radio 
broadcast communication, but the CDA provided no opportunity for oversight by an 
agency “familiar with the unique characteristics of the Internet.”  Id. at 867.  In short, 
Stevens cited precedent in which the Court acknowledged that “[e]ach medium of 
expression . . . may present its own problems[,]” and the weight of these various 
distinguishing factors will further limit First Amendment protection.  Id. at 868 (alterations 
in original).  Thus, the government’s attitude toward the Internet, manifested by 
Congress’s cursory manner in enacting the CDA, shows that, at least on some level, the 
government misunderstands the true nature of the Internet.  Id.  As the Court suggests, if 
Congress wishes to effectively regulate the Internet, a full understanding is at the very least 
necessary, if not mandatory.  Id. 
17 See infra Parts III, V.  See Joseph Reagle, Why the Internet is Good, 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/reagle/regulation-19990326.html (last visited Feb. 
17, 2008).Lawrence Lessig was the first to identify a total of four factors that regulate 
cyberspace:  laws (describing this approach as the use of government sanction and force); 
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legislature have yet to decide on one best practice, and as a result, the 
governing law has grown increasingly inconsistent.18 
This Note attempts to resolve the debate over best practices, in 
particular, in the area of defamation law.19  The importance of the 
Internet as an emerging medium of communication and the limited 
success in its regulation requires increased evaluation of the 
methodologies employed, and the reasons for their failure.20  This Note 
combines the existing regulation furthering the first approach with the 
more traditional third approach and encourages the use of both methods 
as a modest approach to regulation of defamatory communications on 
the Internet, in lieu of passing more comprehensive legislation when the 
Internet escapes its infancy.21  This method provides increased protection 
from liability in the case of small-scale bloggers, and ensures that 
individuals defamed online receive some form of retribution, even in the 
likely event of suit against a judgment-proof defendant. 22  Moreover, 
this method may provide a powerful tool for plaintiffs to use against 
expanding ISP immunity by, at the very least, requiring some action with 
regard to defamatory statements posted on websites.23 
In support of this thesis, this Note begins in Part II by exploring the 
history, growth, and development of the Internet into an influential 
medium dominated by individuals, with an eye toward its structure and 
regulation throughout the past two decades.24  Building on this outline of 
the Internet’s current structure and prior regulatory attempts, Part III 
provides an analysis of the three current regulatory methods employed 
by the legislatures, interpreted by the courts, and criticized by the 
                                                                                                             
social norms (implying regulation by expectation, encouragement, or embarrassment); 
markets (regulation by price and availability); and architecture (described as what 
technology permits, favors, dissuades, or prohibits).  Id. 
18 See infra note 86 (discussing the three Internet regulation methods, including:  self-
regulation, cyberlaws, and the application of traditional laws). 
19 See infra Parts III, V (condensing the three regulatory methods employed throughout 
the Internet’s recent history that developed in large part from Lawrence Lessig’s four 
factors, then analyzing the methods’ flaws and inconsistencies). 
20 See infra Parts III, V (analyzing the drawbacks of the three main regulatory methods 
employed by legislatures, courts, and academics during the Internet’s most recent history). 
21 See infra Part IV (suggesting that applying traditional laws to the Internet is a solution 
to the existing and emerging Internet regulatory problems arising within Congress’s 
existing self-help regulations). 
22 See infra Part IV (describing the unique nature of the Internet and the problems 
various legislative initiatives have encountered in trying to regulate the Internet, and 
discussing the call for more principled legislation that accounts for the ever-changing 
Internet infrastructure). 
23 See infra Part IV (asserting that the immunity of ISPs from liability for damages may 
not include immunity from injunctive or declaratory relief). 
24 See infra Part II (discussing the background and history of the Internet). 
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academic community, in regard to the ever-growing Internet 
community.25  This analysis attempts to highlight each method’s 
drawbacks, including structural incompatibility and inconsistent 
application.26  Next, Part IV recommends that legislatures and the courts 
adopt an effective, but modest, approach to the regulation of Internet 
defamation law, by using the self-help purpose of existing Internet 
regulation in tandem with the existing bricks and mortar legal principles, 
under a too-often dismissed wait-and-see approach.27  Finally, Part V 
concludes by assessing the nature of the current problems of 
unprovided-for plaintiffs and increasingly large liability for potentially 
judgment-proof defendants in the context of the Internet’s history.  In 
addition, Part V provides modest recommendations for legislative 
priorities to address these issues, which if followed could provide not 
only a timely solution to this conflict but could also provide long-
awaited action by previously immune ISPs.  Throughout, this Note 
encourages lawmakers and policymakers to consider the trend toward 
establishing virtual identities that closely track real identities, in large 
part brought on by the advent of social networking sites like Facebook28 
and MySpace,29 and the implications of a system largely ill-equipped to 
address electronic defamation actions.30 
                                                 
25 See infra Part III (analyzing three regulatory methods that have emerged upon close 
examination of the Internet’s recent history). 
26  See infra Parts III.A, C (discussing the self-regulation, cyberlaw, and traditional law 
approaches respectively). 
27 See infra Part IV (discussing an approach that would incorporate the existing self-help 
framework established by Congress with the long-established common law principles of 
retraction to provide victims of cyberwrong relief that is not currently available). 
28 Facebook, About Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/about.php (last visited Nov. 
8, 2007).  “Facebook gives people the power to share and makes the world more open and 
connected.  Millions of people use Facebook everyday to keep up with friends, upload an 
unlimited number of photos, share links and videos, and learn more about the people they 
meet.”  Id.  Facebook was created by Mark Zuckerberg, a Harvard student.  Krista Naposki, 
Facebook:  The Craze that has Crashed into College Life May Have Other Consequences, 
PENDULUM, Jan. 19, 2006, available at http://www.elon.edu/e-web/pendulum/Issues/ 
2006/01_19/features/specialfeature.xhtml.  Mr. Zuckerberg created the website as a 
replacement to the freshman-year ID photos and information booklets.  Id.  But, after nearly 
“6,000 Harvard students signed up within the first three weeks, he started to offer the 
service to other schools.”  Id.  There are a multitude of reasons students choose to join, such 
as the fact that students who join the website get personal pages on which they can post 
their pictures, cell phone numbers, class schedules, and even sexual orientation 
information.  Id.  On Campus:  Facing Facebook, ATHLETIC MANAGEMENT, June/July 2006, at 
6.  For students, “it’s a fun and easy way to meet new friends and keep in touch with old 
ones.”  Id. 
29 MySpace, About Us—MySpace.com, http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuse 
action=misc.aboutus (last visited Nov. 8, 2007).  “MySpace is an online community that lets 
you meet your friends’ friends.”  Id.  MySpace is open to the general public and is largely 
appealing to both teenagers and adults.  Id.  In order to establish an account, a valid e-mail 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
As the Internet continues to grow, legislatures and courts face 
difficult questions regarding how to apply the law of defamation to 
defamatory remarks made in cyberspace.31  With the increased speed of 
                                                                                                             
address is all that is required.  Id.  A recent ComScore Media Metrix report, which tracks 
Internet use, reports that “traffic on MySpace has grown 319 percent in the last year to 37.3 
million visitors in February, making it the top networking site on the Web and the eighth 
most popular website overall.”  Jimmy Watson, Racy Website’s Have Coaches’, AD’s 
Attention, SHREVEPORT TIMES, June 24, 2006, available at http://www.shreveporttimes.com/ 
apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060624/SPORTS/306240006/1001.  Similarly, according to 
a ComScore Media Metrix report, Facebook “has grown 272 percent in the past year, 
making it the 66th most popular website in February.”  See USATODAY.com, What you say 
online could haunt you, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/internetprivacy/2006-03-
08-facebook-myspace_x.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).  Id.  Prior to 2006, the greatest 
distinction between Facebook and MySpace was that Facebook was available only to 
college students and alumni who maintained a valid school e-mail address.  Facebook – 
Timeline, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?timeline (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).  
However, in September 2005, Facebook opened its doors to millions of high school 
students.  Id.  And, one year later on September 26, 2006, Facebook relaxed all of its 
requirements allowing anyone to become a member.  See Facebook – Press Releases, 
http://www.facebook.com/press/releases.php?p=618 (last visited Mar. 10, 2009). 
30 See infra Part II.A (discussing the framework of the Internet in its existing self-
regulation state). 
31 See Justin Hughes, The Internet and the Persistence of Law, 44 B.C. L. REV. 359 (2003) 
(providing insight into the “‘no-law Internet,’ the ‘Internet as a separate jurisdiction,’ and 
Internet law as a ‘translation’ of familiar legal concepts[]”); see also David R. Johnson & 
David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); I. 
Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for “Cyberspace”, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993 (1994); First 
Amendment Center, Internet & First Amendment, 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/speech/internet/index.aspx (last visited Dec. 21, 
2007) (arguing for a presumption of using “bottom up” private rules for cyberspace instead 
of statutes or judicial decisions).  Congress and the courts have addressed Internet 
regulation in a variety of contexts, including, Internet filtering, indecency online, spam, 
cybersquatting, online libel, virtual child pornography, copyright, cyberstalking and 
blogging.  Id.  However, despite the many attempts by ISPs, Congress, and the courts to 
regulate Internet speech, they have failed to adequately address the new threat that 
defamation law poses on the Internet.  See First Amendment Center, Internet & First 
Amendment, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/speech/internet/topic.aspx?topic= 
online_libel (last visited Dec. 21, 2007).  In fact, major legislation in this area, most notably 
the Communication Decency Act (“CDA”), has experienced extensive criticism by the 
courts.  See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868–81 (1997) (striking down two provisions of the 
CDA, but not adopting a medium-specific standard for Internet speech).  Moreover, many 
authors criticized the CDA as not fluid enough to cope with the rapidly changing Internet.  
See Praveen Goyal, Congress Fumbles With the Internet:  Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997), 
21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 637, 638 (1998).  More specifically, this article stated, “Because of 
the rapidly changing nature of telecommunications media such as the Internet and the 
case-specific approach to speech regulation that the Court is likely to adopt in such an area, 
congressional attempts at direct speech regulation are very likely to be inadequate and 
constitutionally unsound.”  Id. 
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Internet innovation, the difference and inconsistencies between the 
various methods used to approach the intersection of the law and the 
Internet become more apparent.32  To understand the issues involving 
best practices for defamation law on the Internet and to build a 
framework for future regulation, it is essential to begin with a brief 
overview of the Internet’s history.33  First, Part II explores the Internet 
evolution, including the rise of virtual worlds and online communities.34  
Next, Part II examines existing regulation of cyberspace that may affect 
the breadth and scope of future regulations.35  Last, Part II addresses the 
history of defamation law and retraction strategy.36 
A. Defamation on the Internet:  The Dynamics of the Law in Cyberspace 
A brief introduction to the history of the Internet, including the more 
recent development of online communities and online publishing, is 
essential to understanding Internet defamation and the potential 
solutions for its regulation in cyberspace.37  First, Part II.A.1 briefly 
discusses the concept of the Internet and its development into a seamless 
communication medium.38  Next, Part II.A.2 describes some of the more 
popular online communities and forecasts coming attractions in online 
life to better track innovation in the virtual world, including the virtual 
self, and its impact on the law.39 
                                                 
32 See infra Part III (discussing the three current methods for Internet regulation—self-
help, cyberlaws, and the application of traditional laws). 
33 See infra Part II. 
34 See infra Part II.A (discussing the evolution of the Internet to a widely accepted form 
of mass media). 
35 See infra Part II.B (discussing attempts to regulate the Internet). 
36 See infra Part II.C (discussing defamation law and retraction strategy at the common 
law, and later, as applied to the Internet). 
37 See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp 44, 49 (D.D.C. 1998). 
This information revolution has . . . presented unprecedented 
challenges relating to rights of privacy and reputational rights of 
individuals, . . . [given the] competition among journalists and news 
organizations for instant news, rumors and other information that is 
communicated so quickly that it is too often unchecked and unverified.  
Needless to say, the legal rules that will govern this new medium are 
just beginning to take shape. 
Id. 
38 See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the early forms of Internet use). 
39 See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the introduction of the Internet to consumers). 
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1. The Early Years:  The Creation and Development of the Internet 
In 1965, the Internet emerged as a new medium for 
communication.40  The concept was simple—telephone lines already in 
existence would allow multiple computers to “talk” with one another 
and thereby share information.41  In 1969, this networking concept 
spawned the creation of larger computer networks, most notably, the 
Internet’s first appearance as the Advanced Research Projects Agency 
Network (“ARPANET”) throughout the 1960s and 1970s.42  At its 
                                                 
40 Barry M. Leiner et al., All About the Internet:  History of the Internet, (Dec. 10, 2003), 
http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml.  The concept of the Internet stemmed 
from a number of memoranda produced by J.C.R. Licklinder of MIT discussing a “Galactic 
Network” that would globally interconnect information and allow access from any given 
point on the network.  Id. 
41 Id.  In 1965, Lawrence Roberts of MIT successfully connected a single computer in 
Massachusetts with a single computer in California using dial-up telephone lines creating 
the first computer network.  Id. 
42 See ROBERT J. DILLIGAN, COMPUTING IN THE WEB AGE:  A WEB-INTERACTIVE 
INTRODUCTION 30 (Plenum Press 1998).  ARPA initially connected four major computers at 
southwestern universities (UCLA, Stanford Research Institute, UC Santa Barbara, and the 
University of Utah).  Id.  See also Shea on Behalf of American Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 
916, 925–26 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).  The joint stipulations in the case provide a brief overview of 
the Internet’s history: 
What we now refer to as the Internet grew out of an experimental 
project of the Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects 
Administration (“ARPA”) designed to provide researchers with direct 
access to supercomputers at a few key laboratories and to facilitate the 
reliable transmission of vital communications.  ARPA supplied funds 
to link computers operated by the military, defense contractors, and 
universities conducting defense-related research through dedicated 
phone lines, creating a “network” known as ARPANet.  Programs on 
the linked computers implemented a technical scheme known as 
“packet-switching,” through which a message from one computer to 
another would be subdivided into smaller, separately addressed pieces 
of data, known as “packets,” sent independently to the message’s 
destination and reassembled upon arrival.  Each computer on the 
network was in turn linked to several other computers, creating any 
number of routes that a communication from one computer could 
follow to reach its destination.  If part of the network were damaged, a 
portion of the message could be re-routed automatically over any other 
path to its ultimate destination, a characteristic of the network 
intended initially to preserve its operability in the event of enemy 
attack. 
 Having successfully implemented a system for the reliable 
transfer of information over a computer network, ARPA began to 
support the development of communications protocols for transferring 
data between different types of computer networks.  Universities, 
research facilities, and commercial entities began to develop and link 
together their own networks implementing these protocols; these 
networks included a high-speed “backbone” network known as 
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inception, the Internet was a very complex system, used primarily by 
computer researchers, experts, engineers, and librarians.43  As familiarity 
with this new network increased, so too did the many user-specific 
advancements, including, in 1972, the first appearance of electronic mail, 
or “e-mail” as it was later dubbed.44  Later, as the potential to improve 
personal communication and achieve increased collaboration became 
apparent, the Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol 
(“TCP/IP”)45 technology was developed to increase networking ability.46  
                                                                                                             
NSFNet, sponsored by the National Science Foundation, smaller 
regional networks, and, eventually, large commercial networks run by 
organizations such as Sprint, IBM, and Performance Systems 
International (commonly known as “PSI”).  As faster networks 
developed, most network traffic shifted away from ARPANet, which 
formally ceased operations in 1990.  What we know as “the Internet” 
today is the series of linked, overlapping networks that gradually 
supplanted ARPANet.  Because the Internet links together 
independent networks that merely use the same data transfer 
protocols, it cannot be said that any single entity or group of entities 
controls, or can control, the content made publicly available on the 
Internet or limits, or can limit, the ability of others to access public 
content.  Rather, the resources available to one with Internet access are 
located on individual computers around the world. 
 It is estimated that as many as forty million individuals have 
access to the information and tools of the Internet, and that figure is 
expected to grow to 200 million by the year 1999.   Access to the 
Internet can take any one of several forms.  First, many educational 
institutions, businesses, libraries, and individual communities 
maintain a computer network linked directly to the Internet and issue 
account numbers and passwords enabling users to gain access to the 
network directly or by modem.  Second, “Internet service providers,” 
generally commercial entities charging a monthly fee, offer modem 
access to computers or networks linked directly to the Internet.   Third, 
national commercial “on-line services”—such as America Online, 
CompuServe, Prodigy, and Microsoft Network—allow subscribers to 
gain access to the Internet while providing extensive content within 
their own proprietary networks.  Finally, organizations and businesses 
can offer access to electronic bulletin-board systems—which, like 
national on-line services, provide certain proprietary content; some 
bulletin-board systems in turn offer users links to the Internet.  
Id. (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). 
43 Id.; see also FREDERICK BETZ, MANAGING TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION:  COMPETITIVE 
ADVANTAGE FROM CHANGE 79–80 (John Wiley & Sons, 2d ed. 2003). 
44 See Paul Frisman, E-Mail Dial ‘E’ for ‘Evidence’, CONN. L. TRIB., Dec. 18, 1995, at 1 
(praising e-mail as a “high-tech” means of communication); Amie M. Soden, Protect Your 
Corporation from E-Mail Litigation; Privacy, Copyright Issues Should be Addressed in Policy, 
CORP. LEGAL TIMES, May 1995, at 19 (describing e-mail as an integral part of the 
technological explosion in communication). 
45 TCP/IP Tutorial, http://www.w3schools.com/tcpip/default.asp (last visited Nov. 8, 
2007).  Communication protocols provide a series of rules for your computer to follow, the 
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ARPANET was the largest of a number of other networks supported by 
the Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects 
Administration (“ARPA”), and the new protocol significantly increased 
the ability of users on one network to communicate with users on 
different networks.47  As a direct result of this achievement, users were 
able to more freely communicate across the resulting “network of 
networks” by simply logging into a router and obtaining an Internet 
Protocol (“IP”) address.48  By 1995, the Internet founders’s original 
vision, to create a system of interconnected networks, greatly expanded 
and resulted in an influx of 50,000 networks across the globe using the 
                                                                                                             
end result of which is a user’s ability to use Internet browsers and servers to connect to the 
Internet.  Id. 
46 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FUNDING A REVOLUTION:  GOVERNMENT SUPPORT 
FOR COMPUTING RESEARCH (National Academy Press 1999), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=6323#orgs; Rita Tehan, Spinning the Web:  
The History of Infrastructure of the Internet, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Aug. 12, 1999, available at 
http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-1026:1.  Religious Tech. 
Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1995) 
(quoting DANIEL P. DERN, THE INTERNET GUIDE FOR NEW USERS 16 (1994)).  What started as 
a single computer network for a government project grew to incorporate many additional 
networks and developed the collective name of the Internet which in its most technical 
sense is a “‘set of all interconnected IP networks’—the collection of several thousand local, 
regional, and global computer networks interconnected in real time via the TCP/IP 
Internetworking Protocol suite . . . . ”   Id. 
47 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FUNDING A REVOLUTION:  GOVERNMENT SUPPORT 
FOR COMPUTING RESEARCH (National Academy Press 1999), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=6323#orgs.  A history of the Internet is 
available in many additional published sources.  See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 
830–31 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); JAMES GILLES & ROBERT CAILLIAU, HOW THE 
WEB WAS BORN:  THE STORY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB (Oxford University Press 2000); 
CHRISTOS J.P. MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., HISTORY OF THE INTERNET:  A CHRONOLOGY, 1843 TO THE 
PRESENT (ABC-CLIO 1999); Michael W. Loudenslager, Allowing Another Policeman on the 
Information Superhighway:  State Interests and Federalism on the Internet in the Face of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 191, 257–63 (2003) (discussing the origins of the 
Internet). 
48 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FUNDING A REVOLUTION:  GOVERNMENT SUPPORT 
FOR COMPUTING RESEARCH (National Academy Press 1999), available at  
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=6323&page=173; see also Internet, THE 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2004), available at 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/Internet (defining Internet as “[a]n 
interconnected system of networks that connects computers around the world via the 
TCP/IP protocol[]”). 
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TCP/IP protocol.49  Thus, the Internet, as envisioned by its founders, was 
born.50 
2. The Advent of Cyberspace51 
The increase in forums and the ability of Internet users to publish 
information—through bulletin boards, chat rooms, and web journals, 
often referred to as blogs—has created a greater threat of damage to 
one’s reputation on a much larger scale.52  Defamation, libel, and slander 
issues in cyberspace have all posed challenges for the law, and in order 
to better understand the legal issues, one must first understand how the 
information superhighway,53 and the growing cyber community, work.54 
                                                 
49 Susan P. Crawford, Internet Think, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 467, 470 (2007); see 
also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Penn. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (noting 
that the ARPANET evolved to include networks catered to “universities, corporations, and 
people around the world,” its first merger of networks produced the “DARPA Internet,” 
and after later developments, it became known as simply the “Internet[]”). 
50 See supra note 40 (discussing the desire for the Internet to grow into a galactic network 
of sorts). 
51 R. Timothy Muth, Old Doctrines on a New Frontier:  Defamation and Jurisdiction in 
Cyberspace, WIS. LAW. 10, 11 (Sept. 1995), available at Westlaw at 68-SEP WILAW 10.  
“Cyberspace refers to the interaction of people and businesses over computer networks, 
electronic bulletin boards and commercial online services.  The largest and most visible 
manifestation of cyberspace is the Internet—a worldwide network of networks 
electronically connecting millions of computers and computer users.”  Id. 
52 See generally R. SCOTT HALL, THE BLOG AHEAD:  HOW CITIZEN-GENERATED MEDIA IS 
RADICALLY TILTING THE COMMUNICATIONS BALANCE (Deane Rink ed., Morgan James 
Publishing, LLC 2006); Patrick Beeson, Blogging:  What is it? And How Has It Affected the 
Media?, THE QUILL, Mar. 2005, at 16 (citing Rebecca Blood, an authority on the nature of 
blogs, who describes “blogs” as a “continuous, chronological series of posts—some inviting 
comments from readers—on any topic imaginable, often containing links to sites 
throughout the Internet”); Danielle M. Conway-Jones, Defamation in the Digital Age:  
Liability in Chat Rooms, on Electronic Bulletin Boards, and in the Blogosphere, 29 ALI-ABA BUS. 
L.J. 17, 21–22 (2005) (discussing the user services provided by leading blog sites—
www.xanga.com, www.blogspot.com, and www.livejournal.com). 
53 Clay Calvert, Regulating Cyberspace:  Metaphor, Rhetoric, Reality, and the Framing of Legal 
Options, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 541, 544 n.14 (1998); Computer Dictionary, 
“Information Superhighway”, http://www.computerhope.com/jargon/i/infosupe.htm 
(last visited Dec. 21, 2007) (defining “Information Superhighway” as “[a] term coined by 
Vice President Albert Gore when giving a speech January 11, 1994 to describe a future of 
computers accessing and communicating over a world-wide network[]”).  The site also 
notes that “[l]ater during a CNN interview, Gore stated ‘During my service in the United 
States Congress, I took the initiative in creating the Internet.’  This statement helped spark 
the belief that Al Gore invented the Internet.”  Computer Dictionary, “Information 
Superhighway”, supra.  But see New Network Institute, Chapter I Promises, Promises,  
http://www.newnetworks.com/chapter1.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2007) (tracing the 
coining of the term “Information Superhighway” to an April 12, 1993 issue of Time 
Magazine bearing the cover “The Info Highway:  Bringing a Revolution in Entertainment, 
News and Communication:  Coming Soon to your TV Screen[]”). 
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Prior to Internet access becoming widely available, the consumer 
based Internet developed largely as an Internet forum, known as a 
Bulletin Board System (“BBS”), which was the primary online 
community.55  The early BBSs allowed Internet users to publish and 
receive messages on more than 10,000 newsgroups, each based upon a 
particular topic of interest.56  This new soapbox style forum sparked 
spirited debate on a wide-range of topics; however, it was not without 
flaws as message posts often digressed to personal attacks against other 
users, termed “flaming” by the system’s early adopters.57  An early 
advantage of message boards was the allowance of greater content 
control, often through the assignment of moderators, a feature that was 
not offered by many of the BBSs’s early successors.58 
                                                                                                             
54 See generally HALL, supra note 52.  This source asserts its prediction regarding the 
future of blogs: 
Let me make a prediction.  Five years from now, the blogosphere will 
have developed into a powerful economic engine that has all but 
driven newspapers into oblivion, has morphed (thanks to cell phone 
cameras) into a video medium that challenges television news, and has 
created a whole new group of major companies and media superstars.  
Billions of dollars will be made by those prescient enough to either get 
onboard or invest in these companies.  At this point, the industry will 
then undergo its first shakeout, with the loss of perhaps several million 
blogs, though the overall industry will continue to grow at a steady 
pace. 
Id. at iii. (quoting Michael S. Malone, ABCNews.com, Silicon Insider Column, November 4, 
2005). 
55 See MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY 50 (2d ed., Blackwell 
Publishing 2000) (noting that BBS systems “became the electronic notice-boards of all kinds 
of interests and affinities, creating . . . ‘virtual communities[]’”).  The BBS operated as a 
computer network running software that enabled users, who dialed into the system over 
the existing telephone framework, to download software and other information or upload 
the same, and, in addition, allowed users to access news articles and to view and exchange 
message posts with other users.  Id.  The appeal of the bulletin board system was its 
functionality as a type of social network targeted for specific interest groups.  Id.   Today, 
many of the old message boards are still available on Google.  See FRANCES JACOBSON 
HARRIS, I FOUND IT ON THE INTERNET:  COMING OF AGE ONLINE 41 (American Library 
Association 2005) (citing http://www.groups.google.com). 
56 Muth, supra note 51, at 10–11.  For an example of one of the first bulletin boards 
created in 1996, UBB.classic (i.e. the Ultimate Bulletin Board), now in its most recent form 
UBB.threads, see http://www.ubbcentral.com/.  Id. 
57 URS E. GATTIKER, THE INTERNET AS A DIVERSE COMMUNITY:  CULTURAL, 
ORGANIZATIONAL, AND POLITICAL ISSUES 195 (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 2001) 
(defining the term “flamed” as “[a] virulent and often largely personal attack against the 
author of a posting on the Internet.  Flaming occurs more frequently than is probably 
desirable[]”); see also Mark Dery, Flame Wars, in FLAME WARS:  THE DISCOURSE OF 
CYBERCULTURE (Mark Dery, ed., Duke Univ. Press 1994) (further defining the concept of 
flame wars). 
58 Danielle M. Conway-Jones, Defamation in the Digital Age:  Liability in Chat Rooms, on 
Electronic Bulletin Boards, and in the Blogosphere, SK102 ALI-ABA 63, 67 (2005).  Moderators 
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Later, as the speed of the Internet increased, so too did the 
popularity of Instant Messenger (“IM”) software.59  The IM system 
improved upon the early editorial posting design of BBSs and allowed 
users to enter virtual chat rooms “where two or more individuals 
connected to the Internet [could] have real-time, synchronous 
conversations” by simply typing messages to one another on their 
computers.60  The speed and automatic posting qualities of IMs allowed 
the majority of chat rooms to remain free from the editorial limitations 
imposed by the message board predecessors and often allowed for little, 
if any, content intervention.61 
By the advent of the user-friendly World Wide Web—the weblog, 
later dubbed the blog—evolved as an online journal. 62  In their infancy, 
                                                                                                             
maintained the ability to delete, edit, or remove posts or engage in “other mechanisms 
designed to keep the peace” on the message board.  Id. 
59 Id.  The term “IM” is defined as follows:  “[s]hort for Instant Messenger, IM is a 
software utility that allows users connected to the Internet or a corporate network to 
quickly send text messages and files between other IM users.”  See Computer Dictionary, 
“IM”, http://www.computerhope.com/jargon/i/im.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2007).  The 
site includes a short list of some of the popular and widely used instant messenger 
programs available today, including “AOL AIM (ICQ) – http://www.aim.com/, Google 
Talk – http://www.google.com/talk/, Skype – http://www.skype.com, Jabber – 
http://www.jabber.org/, MSN Messenger – http://messenger.msn.com/, Yahoo! 
Messenger – http://messenger.yahoo.com/.”  Id.  In addition, Windows Live Messenger, 
yet another instant messaging service, boasts of its ability to allow users to connect 
instantly using text, voice, and video, or leave messages if the other user is unavailable.  See 
Windows Live Messenger – Overview, http://get.live.com/messenger/overview (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2007).   
60 See Conway-Jones, supra note 57.  Chat rooms are further defined as 
 a “place” where two or more individuals connected to the Internet 
have real-time, synchronous conversations (usually text based) by 
typing messages into their computer.  Groups gather to chat about 
various subjects.  As you type, everything you type is displayed to the 
other members of the chat group.  Some chat rooms are “moderated” 
whereby certain messages are not broadcast because they do not 
conform to the standards set up by the operator of the service.  
Reasons for a message being blocked could include:  discussion off the 
topic, bad language, or repeat messaging especially of undesirable or 
obscene text, known as flaming.  The majority of chat rooms however, 
remain “open” such that messages are posted automatically with no 
human intervention.  And, to complicate matters further, people may 
enter chat rooms and begin discussion threads with prior verification 
of user identity. 
Id. 
61 Id.  The speed at which chat room speech operates is not unlike that of a telephone 
and, therefore, became difficult, if not impossible, to regulate individual conversations in 
real-time.  Id. 
62 See JAMES GILLIES & ROBERT CAILLIAU, HOW THE WEB WAS BORN:  THE STORY OF THE 
WORLD WIDE WEB 92–96 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000).  In 1989, Tim Berners-Lee, Sam Walker, 
and Robert Cailliau created the concept for the World Wide Web.  Id.  One year later, 
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blogs were simply the manually updated portions of otherwise static 
websites.63  Today, blogs have made the creation and publication of 
content online as simple as browsing the web.64  Thus, modern blogging 
applications have removed virtually all of the technical barriers to 
publication and are now embraced by the masses.65  As a result, blogs 
                                                                                                             
Berners-Lee developed a browser/editor program and coined the name World Wide Web 
as the name of the program.  Id.  In recent years, the information superhighway has had a 
profound effect on nearly every aspect of our lives—it is an essential tool for families to 
keep in touch, for consumers, and for individuals to inform themselves on news and areas 
of interest.  The Internet allows people to “meet, and talk, and live in cyberspace in ways 
not possible in real space.”  Laurence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1745–
46 (1995) (“What will be new are the communities that this space will allow, and the 
constructive . . . possibilities that these communities will bring.”). 
63 See generally David Kline & Dan Burstein, BLOG! HOW THE NEWEST MEDIA 
REVOLUTION IS CHANGING POLITICS, BUSINESS, AND CULTURE (CDS Books 2005).  See also 
Amy Gahran, E-Media Tidebits Editor, Poynter Online, On Facing the Heat, 
http://www.poynter.org/dg.lts/id.31/aid.91283/column.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2007).  
Offering gripes regarding websites without a commenting feature, the author notes: 
People who start a blog and don’t have a commenting function -- I just 
think they’re cowards.  I mean, if you’re going to be out there, you’ve 
got to have a real blog.  Everybody else does!  It’s kind of pathetic to be 
a professional journalist and feel like you can’t handle the heat.  All 
those amateurs out there allow comments, and that’s what makes a 
blog really interesting, because it’s a conversation. 
Id. (quoting Carl Zimmer, http://www.corante.com/loom). 
64 See Computer Dictionary, “Weblog”, http://www.computerhope.com/jargon/w/ 
weblog.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2007).  The site provides a brief explanation of weblogs, or 
blogs: 
A weblog, or blog, is a listing of text, images, and/or other objects that 
are arranged in a chronological order that first started appearing in 
1998.  Blogs are often maintained and run by a single individual, 
updated daily, and/or contain random personal remarks about a topic, 
a personal ramble, an update on the person’s life and/or their current 
feelings.  In many ways, many weblogs are like a personal journal, 
diary or a look into another individual’s life and can be a great way to 
learn about people, events, places, and much more from millions of 
people around the world. 
Some examples of software and services that users use to create and 
start their own weblogs are Blogger, Manila, Movable Type, MySpace, 
LiveJournal, Radio Userland, and TypePad. 
Id. 
65 See Jeffrey M. Schlossberg & Kimberly B. Malerba, Outside Counsel:  Employer 
Regulation of Blogging, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 31, 2005, at 4: 
 While originally blogs were used by the technically savvy, blogs 
are now being used by the masses as a type of electronic diary where 
people can post their thoughts on everything from politics and life in 
general[] . . . . The difference between a blog and a diary, however, is 
that anyone with access to the Internet can read, copy, e-mail or print 
the blog entries. 
Id.; see also supra Kline, note 63.   
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have become a very influential component on the Internet.  Blogs have 
become news sources, methods to memorialize thoughts and reactions to 
news, tools for creating online communities based upon similar interests, 
and, more recently, have played a large part in political debates.66 
Today, online communities have reached their pinnacle with the rise 
of Facebook and other social networking sites.67  The new online 
community allows users to merge their real identity with their virtual 
identity by providing an interactive, image-laden directory of former 
and current classmates who share similar lifestyles and interests.68  Some 
analysts note that the new Facebook generation has allowed the Internet 
to grow up.69  Under the old regime, the idea seemed to be that the 
Internet allowed users to escape their real identity and re-invent 
themselves without public scorn or Internet oversight; thus, users sought 
freedom from the social burdens and stigma of real life.70  By contrast, 
                                                 
66 See Alexa Web Search, United States—Alexa Top 100 Sites, http://www.alexa.com/ 
site/ds/top_sites?cc=US&ts_mode=country&lang=none (last visited Oct. 8, 2007). 
67 See Facebook, About Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/facebook (showing one of 
today’s online communities) (last visited Nov. 8, 2007). 
68 Id.  “Facebook gives people the power to share and makes the world more open and 
connected.  Millions of people use Facebook everyday to keep up with friends, upload an 
unlimited number of photos, share links and videos, and learn more about the people they 
meet.”  Id.  The Facebook website allows its users to create profiles, complete with personal 
information, interests, and photos.  Id.  In addition, the site allows users to exchange 
messages, both private and public, and to join interest groups.  Id.  Facebook boasts 
upwards of 46 million users, with an additional 200,000 users signing up daily since 
January 2007.  Facebook, Statistics, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2007).  Perhaps even more startlingly, more than half the users of the 
website use it daily, spending on average 20 minutes a day and uploading more than 14 
million pictures.  Id.  
69 Lev Grossman, Why Facebook Is the Future, TIME, Aug. 23, 2007, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1655722,00.html. This article 
contrasts popular technological advancements on the Internet and concludes that: 
Whereas Google is a brilliant technological hack, Facebook is primarily 
a feat of social engineering.  (It wouldn’t be a bad idea for Google to 
acquire Facebook, the way it snaffled YouTube, but it’s almost 
certainly too late in the day for that.  Yahoo! offered a billion for 
Facebook last year and was rebuffed.)  Facebook’s appeal is both 
obvious and rather subtle.  It’s a website, but in a sense, it’s another 
version of the Internet itself:  a Net within the Net, one that’s 
everything the larger Net is not. 
Id. 
70 Id.  Thus, the lure of secrecy on the net is dwindling as the Internet is and will 
continue to merge our everyday image with our online personalities until the distinction 
disappears.  Id.  In fact, scholars note that the Internet, rather than decreasing socialability 
and real world contact (as had been previously predicted) instead has increased contact by 
strengthening both relationships and facilitating meetings.  BARRY WELLMAN & CAROLINE 
HAYTHORNTHWAITE, THE INTERNET IN EVERYDAY LIFE 82 (Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2002) 
(investigating how being online fits into people’s everyday lives). 
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today’s Internet encourages and embraces real-world identities.71  For 
example, on Facebook, for the most part, people use their real names, 
post pictures of themselves, and “also declare their sex, age, 
whereabouts, romantic status and institutional affiliations.”72  However, 
the emergence of blogging and social networking as a replacement to 
online anonymity has brought a range of legal liabilities and other 
unforeseen consequences.73  As a result, the legislatures and the courts 
are charged with developing and interpreting the law in relation to this 
newly formed medium.74 
B. Early Attempts to Regulate the World Wide Web 
This Part briefly describes early attempts by the courts, and later by 
Congress, to regulate the seemingly boundary-less Internet.  First, Part 
II.B.1 briefly explores attempts by the judiciary to impose liability for 
wrongs that occurred in cyberspace and the ensuing inconsistency that 
followed.  Second, Part II.B.2 examines Congress’s regulatory changes 
that sought to clear up judicially created inconsistencies. 
1. Pre-Communications Decency Act:  The Split of Authority in the 
Early Years 
In the early 1990s, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York undertook cyber-libel as a question of first 
impression.75  In Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., the district court 
interpreted the role of CompuServe as an Internet Service Provider (ISP) 
as merely a passive conduit for expressive activity.76  Thus, the district 
                                                 
71 See supra note 68 (describing one of the most popular social networking communities). 
72 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.  See also KAREL M. BALOUN, INSIDE 
FACEBOOK:  LIFE, WORK AND VISIONS OF GREATNESS 7 (Karel Baloun 2006).  The book briefly 
describes the Facebook environment: 
 Facebook is No. 1 in the amount of time spent on-site by visiting users.  
Think about that.  A site that didn’t even exist three years ago is the 
place on the Internet where visiting users spend more time than on any 
other site.  Facebook is the most important site for folks in college.  
Facebook is the most successful privately held, closed social network.  
Facebook is also a first job for many of the people who work there, and 
a once-in-a-lifetime experience for everyone else. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
73 See supra note 68 (discussing how the communication environment established by 
Facebook creates ample opportunity for defamation on the Internet as users are 
encouraged to use the site to post pictures and messages to other users on the network). 
74 See infra Part II.B (discussing early attempts to regulate the Internet). 
75 Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
76 Id. at 141.  The district court applied a three-prong test to determine CompuServe’s 
liability for defamation to determine:  (1) whether the company was a publisher or 
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court held that CompuServe could not be held liable under traditional 
defamation principles as a distributor because it completely lacked 
editorial control.77 
Four years later, in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,78 the 
New York Supreme Court entered a judgment that sparked far more 
controversy than its predecessor, Cubby, Inc.79  In Stratton Oakmont, an 
investment firm sued Prodigy, an ISP, for defamatory messages posted 
by third-party subscribers of Prodigy’s web services, in particular, the 
Money Talk bulletin board.80  Contrary to the decision in Cubby, Inc., the 
                                                                                                             
distributor; (2) the extent of editorial control, if any; and (3) whether there is an affirmative 
showing that CompuServe knew or should have known the defamatory nature of the 
comments posted to the discussion boards.  Id. at 139–41. 
77 Id.  The district court noted that 
[w]ith respect to the Rumorville publication, the undisputed facts are 
that DFA uploads the text of Rumorville into CompuServe’s data 
banks and makes it available to approved CIS subscribers 
instantaneously.   CompuServe has no more editorial control over such 
a publication than does a public library, book store, or newsstand, and 
it would be no more feasible for CompuServe to examine every 
publication it carries for potentially defamatory statements than it 
would be for any other distributor to do so.  “First Amendment 
guarantees have long been recognized as protecting distributors of 
publications . . . . Obviously, the national distributor of hundreds of 
periodicals has no duty to monitor each issue of every periodical it 
distributes.  Such a rule would be an impermissible burden on the First 
Amendment.” 
Id. at 140 (quoting Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 139 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied 
471 U.S. 1054) (footnote omitted) (ellipsis in original); see also Daniel v. Dow Jones & 
Co.,520 N.Y.S.2d 334, 340 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987) (holding that computerized database service 
“is one of the modern, technologically interesting, alternative ways the public may obtain 
up-to-the-minute news[]” and “is entitled to the same protection as more established 
means of news distribution[]”). 
78 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 
1995), superseded by statute, Communications Decency Act of 1996, (“CDA”) 47 U.S.C. § 230 
(2000). 
79 Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
80 Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710 at *1.  The Money Talk bulletin board was a 
financial information bulletin board with strong readership on which subscribers posted 
defamatory comments about Stratton Oakmont, Inc.’s fraudulent business practices.  Id. at 
*1–2.  The statements posted to the Money Talk bulletin board stated: 
(a) STRATTON OAKMONT, INC. (“STRATTON”), a securities 
investment banking firm, and DANIEL PORUSH, STRATTON’s 
president, committed criminal and fraudulent acts in connection with 
the initial public offering of stock of Solomon-Page Ltd.; 
(b) the Solomon-Page offering was a “major criminal fraud” and “100% 
criminal fraud”; 
(c) PORUSH was “soon to be proven criminal”; and, 
(d) STRATTON was a “cult of brokers who either lie for a living or get 
fired.” 
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court held that Prodigy was liable for postings on the bulletin board due 
to its decision to retain the ability to delete and otherwise manipulate 
user postings, likely a result of its desire to attract a market of users 
seeking a “family oriented” computer service.81 
In part, the resulting inconsistency in the precedent regarding ISP 
liability led to greater speech protection for ISPs under the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA” or “section 230” or “the 
Act”).82 
2. Post-CDA:  The After-Effects of Congress’s Regulation 
The Stratton Oakmont and Cubby decisions created an interesting 
paradox:  on the one hand, a message board operator could abstain from 
maintaining editorial control and avoid liability as a passive conduit of 
information;83 on the other hand, any attempt to edit and control user 
content may have the potential consequence of added liability.84 
At the time the Stratton Oakmont decision came down in 1995, 
Congress was considering an overhaul of the Communications Act of 
1934.85  The new Telecommunications Act of 1996 proposed a massive 
                                                                                                             
Id. at *1.  Stratton sued Prodigy for one hundred million dollars in compensatory damages 
and another one hundred million dollars for punitive damages.  Id. 
81 Id. at *4–5.  “PRODIGY’s conscious choice, to gain the benefits of editorial control, has 
opened it up to a greater liability than CompuServe and other computer networks that 
make no such choice.”  Id.  The court determined in Stratton that Prodigy effectively 
regulated the content and acted more as a publisher by retaining the ability to exhibit 
editorial control over the content.  Id. at *3; cf. Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 140 (noting that 
CompuServe acted as a distributor, in that it collected a fee to set-up an online forum for its 
subscribers after which it retained no editorial control over the content). 
82 47 U.S.C. § 230.  The CDA was included in Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 and focused primarily on reducing regulation and promoting competition in local 
telephone and broadcast markets.  Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 
§ 501, 110 Stat. 56, 133 (1996).  The proposal was accepted by a vote of 84 to 16.  
Communications—Telecommunications—Child shield/obscene telecommunications 
amendment, CONG. INDEX 1995–1996 23,027 (June 14, 1995).  On February 8, 1996, just days 
after the CDA’s passage into law, the usually vibrant and colorful world of cyberspace 
turned black as hundreds of website hosts blackened their websites for forty-eight hours in 
protest of the enactment of the CDA.  See Mike Snider, Cyber Protest Planned Over Telecom 
Bill, USA TODAY, Feb. 7, 1996, at A1; see also Jeff Frentzen, The CDA in review:  silencing the 
whiners, PC WEEK, Aug. 30, 1997, at 181 (discussing the “Black Thursday” protest). 
83 See Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 141 (the court held that ISPs are merely a passive 
conduit and, as such, cannot be subject to liability for any failure to edit content). 
84 Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710 at *1 (setting the precedent that ISPs who 
perform editorial controls would be subject to liability). 
85 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).  The Communications Act of 1934 re-dubbed the Federal Radio 
Commission as the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”).  Id. (describing the 
purposes of this chapter).  In addition, it transferred the regulation of telephone services 
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deregulation of broadcast media, the first of its kind in nearly sixty-two 
years.86  However, hidden beneath the surface of the Act were several 
additional provisions related to the regulation of the untamed Internet 
that effectively overruled Stratton Oakmont.87 
The advent of the CDA accomplished two of Congress’s primary 
goals.88  First, it was an attempt to regulate pornography and obscenity 
on the Internet to protect children.89  Second, section 230 of the Act, 
arguably the most controversial in recent years, declared that operators 
and users of Internet services could not be held liable for the remarks of 
third parties who use their services.90 
The CDA quickly met its first opposition in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in ACLU v. Reno,91 and 
under careful scrutiny, the district court invalidated key provisions of 
the CDA.92  This issue was brought before the United States Supreme 
                                                                                                             
under the FCC umbrella; formerly the Interstate Commerce Commission regulated 
telephone services.  Id. 
86 47 U.S.C. § 230.  This attempt at regulation met stark opposition with other proposed 
systems of Internet regulation.  See Jae Hong Lee, Batzel v. Smith & Barrett v. Rosenthal:  
Defamation Liability for Third-Party Content on the Internet, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 485–88 
(2004) (discussing a traditional law approach to regulation); Johnson & Post, supra note 31, 
at 1367 (discussing the development of cyberlaws); John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of 
Independence in Cyberspace, ELECTRONIC FREEDOM FOUNDATION, Feb. 8, 1996, 
http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html (discussing Internet autonomy and 
self-regulation). 
87 47 U.S.C. § 230; see David E. Loundy, E-LAW:  Computer Information Systems Law and 
System Operator Liability, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1075, 1089–90 (1998) (discussion of the 
CDA’s safe harbor provision and its relationship to Stratton Oakmont). 
88 Loundy, supra note 87, at 1084, 1102 (noting the purposes related to both content 
regulation, which were later ruled unconstitutional, and liability for Internet service 
providers and users). 
89 141 CONG. REC. S8088-89 (daily ed. June 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon).  Senator 
James Exon (Democrat – Nebraska) introducted the CDA on February 1, 1995.  141 CONG. 
REC. S1953 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995).  He stated, “the information superhighway should not 
become a red light district.  This legislation will keep that from happening and extend the 
standards of decency which have protected telephone users to new telecommunications 
devices.”  Id.  The bill served as an amendment to section 230 of Title 47 of the United 
States Code entitled “[o]bscene or harassing telephone calls in the District of Columbia or 
in interstate or foreign communications.”  47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000). 
90 See H.R.  REP. NO. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).  The House Conference Report 
states that “[o]ne of the specific purposes of [section 230] is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. 
Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have treated such providers and users as 
publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because they have restricted access 
to objectionable material.”  Id.  
91 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
92 Id. at 849.  Almost immediately after lawmakers signed the CDA into law, the ACLU 
and numerous other organizations brought this action seeking a preliminary injunction 
and raising a facial constitutional challenge to the provisions of the CDA.  Id. at 826–27.  
The district court conducted extensive fact-finding, no fewer than nineteen pages of text, 
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Court and, later the same month, in Reno v. ACLU,93 the Court upheld 
the decision of the district court.94  The Supreme Court analyzed the 
CDA’s provisions criminalizing the knowing transmission of obscene or 
indecent material, and in particular, the regulation of indecent messages to 
persons under the age of eighteen, and concluded that the provisions 
lacked the precision required by the First Amendment.95  Thus, the Court 
struck down the law as an unconstitutionally overbroad infringement on 
the First Amendment, despite the government’s asserted interest in 
protecting children from indecency.96 
                                                                                                             
cataloging the inner workings of computers in cyberspace.  Id. at 830–49.  The district court 
rejected any attempt by the Government, collectively Janet Reno, the Attorney General of 
the United States, and the United States Department of Justice, to use the term “indecent” 
in the statute with the Court’s earlier analysis of the term in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 
U.S. 726, 739–40 (1978).  Id.  In Pacifica, the Court held that George Carlin’s “Filthy Words” 
broadcast, though it was not obscene, was indecent, and given the compelling interest in 
the protection of child audiences and privacy interests of shielding unwanted speech from 
the home was subject to restriction.  Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748–51.  Thus, the Court for the first 
time upheld a regulation to the on-air, free, broadcast media.  Id. at 762. 
93 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (declaring the prohibition of indecent communication over the 
Internet unconstitutional). 
94 Id. 
The breadth of the CDA’s coverage is wholly unprecedented. . . . [T]he 
scope of the CDA is not limited to commercial speech or commercial 
entities.  Its open-ended prohibitions embrace all nonprofit entities and 
individuals posting indecent messages or displaying them on their 
own computers in the presence of minors.  The general, undefined 
terms “indecent” and “patently offensive” cover large amounts of 
nonpornographic material with serious educational or other value. 
Id. at 877. 
95 Id. at 846.  Despite Congress’s narrowing attempts to protect children from 
pornography on the Internet, the Court reached the same result in its analysis of the Child 
Online Protection Act (“COPA”) in Ashcroft v. ACLU.  542 U.S. 656 (2001).  Under COPA, 
Congress narrowed the reach of its prior attempts to protect children from exposure to 
indecent material on the Internet.  Id. at 668–69 (in previous challenges to the use of filters 
in the Supreme Court Congress’s attempts to mandate the use of filters did not pass strict 
scrutiny). Unlike filters the new COPA legislation would penalize communications posted 
for commercial purposes which contained material harmful to minors.  Id. at 661; see also 47 
U.S.C. § 231 (the amended COPA statute applies only to communication for commercial 
purposes).  Therefore, COPA did not prohibit indecent material on the Internet, but merely 
required commercial website owners to take reasonable steps to bar children from their 
site.  Id. at 668–69.  The Court did not hold that the statute was overbroad even though it 
relied on community standards to determine “material that is harmful to minors[,]” rather 
it held that on this record the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it determined 
the statute was unconstitutional, however, the Court remanded to determine if less 
restrictive alternatives existed to further the government’s objective.  Id. at  672–73. 
96 Reno, 521 U.S. at 885.  The Government’s interest in preventing potentially harmful 
communication from reaching children is unpersuasive as it in turn suppresses vast 
amounts of speech that adults have a First Amendment right to transmit and receive.  Id.  
The breadth of the statute is too large given that there was no assertion by the Government 
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The second, and more recent, CDA-sparked controversy concerned 
the immunity from liability granted to both ISPs and third-party users 
under section 230(c)(1).97  Section 230’s grant of immunity to ISPs was 
quickly confirmed by the court in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.98  The 
Zeran court rejected the challenge to ISP immunity and cited Congress’s 
apparent rationale for granting the favored immunity:  “[T]o maintain 
the robust nature of Internet communication and, accordingly,” to keep 
ISPs from imposing “severe[] restrict[ions on] the number and type of 
messages posted[]” out of fear of liability.99  In 1998, Blumenthal v. 
Drudge100 extended Zeran, and the court held that even ISPs who pay 
                                                                                                             
that less restrictive alternatives did not exist.  Id. at 879.  Perhaps the most significant aspect 
of the Court’s decision in Reno is its willingness to apply traditional First Amendment 
precedent to a new medium.  Id.  864–68. 
97 See 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(1).  “No provider . . . of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.”  Id.  See also Andrea L. Julian, Comment, Freedom of Libel:  How an 
Expansive Interpretation of 47 U.S.C. § 230 Affects the Defamation Victim in the Ninth Circuit, 40 
IDAHO L. REV. 509, 523–24 (2004) (discussing the controversey over the potential for self-
regulating ISPs to be assigned defamation liability while creating a liability free pass for 
ISPs who do not). 
98 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).  In Zeran, a user posted a message to an America 
Online bulletin board that advertised the sale of t-shirts that “featur[ed] offensive and 
tasteless slogans related to the April 19, 1995, bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City.”  Id. at 329. 
99 Id. at 330, 331.  The court noted: 
Specifically, § 230 precludes courts from entertaining claims that 
would place a computer service provider in a publisher's role.  Thus, 
lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a 
publisher's traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether 
to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred. 
Id. at 330. 
100 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).  In Blumenthal v. Drudge, the plaintiff Blumenthal was a 
high-ranking Clinton aide.  Id. at 46.  The defendant, Matt Drudge, is the writer and 
publisher of the Drudge Report, a website devoted to conservative political news, opinion, 
and gossip.  Id. at 47.  In addition to his own website, Drudge also published stories via 
AOL, an online service provider and defendant in this matter.  Id.  In the instant case, 
Drudge published a story about Blumenthal which quoted an anonymous source as 
disclosing allegations that Blumenthal abused his spouse.  Id. at 46.  As a result, the 
Blumenthals filed a Complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia that 
demanded $30,000,001.00 in damages.  See Plaintiff’s Compl. ¶ 273.  The court took up the 
issue of AOL’s liability for defamatory statements posted to their website, and concluded 
AOL should be dismissed from the lawsuit pursuant to the immunity from liability granted 
by the CDA.  Id. at 53.  However, the majority noted its discomfort with this result, and 
further discussed the purpose behind Congress’s enactment of the CDA, which it had no 
choice but to follow in the instant case: 
If it were writing on a clean slate, this Court would agree with 
plaintiffs.  AOL has certain editorial rights with respect to the content 
provided by Drudge and disseminated by AOL, including the right to 
require changes in content and to remove it; and it has affirmatively 
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members for posting certain content are immune from any tort liability 
derived from the posting.101  In 2006, another court decided Barrett v. 
Rosenthal,102 and it too relied upon Zeran, holding that until Congress 
decides to revisit the issue, ISPs are immune.103  Thus, many defamed 
plaintiffs are restricted to recovery only against the original source, not 
merely for a user’s republished version of the same defamatory 
material.104 
Although the Zeran, Blumenthal, and Barrett cases exhibit an 
understanding of Congress’s attempt to suppress the potential chilling 
effects of speech on the Internet that would result from ISP liability for 
member postings, these rulings have also affirmed that there is little 
recourse for Internet libel victims, at least those seeking the deep pockets 
of Internet ISPs.105  At present, neither ISPs nor anonymous posters are 
subject to liability for defamatory statements.106  However, while section 
230 may frustrate the ability of individuals and businesses that seek to 
                                                                                                             
promoted Drudge as a new source of unverified instant gossip on 
AOL. . . . But Congress has made a different policy choice by providing 
immunity even where the interactive service provider has an active, 
even aggressive role in making available content prepared by others.  
In some sort of tacit quid pro quo arrangement with the service provider 
community, Congress has conferred immunity from tort liability as an 
incentive to Internet service providers to self-police the Internet for 
obscenity and other offensive material, even where the self-policing is 
unsuccessful or not even attempted. 
Id. at 51–52. 
101 Id. at 51–52 (briefly discussing the Zeran opinion). 
102 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006). 
103 Id. at 529.  Briefly, the facts of this opinion reveal that Bolen sent an e-mail 
correspondence to Rosenthal that was alleged to be defamatory.  Id. at 513–14.  Then, 
Rosenthal copied the e-mail received from Bolan to two separate newsgroups.  Id. at 514.  
Rosenthal then defended the suit under section 230 immunity.  Id. at 513.  The trial court 
granted the motion to dismiss in light of Rosenthal’s purported section 230 immunity.  Id. 
at 514.  On appeal, the trial court’s decision was reversed.  Id.  The California Supreme 
Court then interpreted the immunity provision of section 230 as also applying to individual 
users of Internet services and did not acknowledge an exception for distributor liability.  Id. 
at 514.  The court concluded, “Congress has comprehensively immunized republication by 
individual Internet users.”  Id. at 529.  The term user, defined as any person or entity that 
uses an interactive computer service, establishes that there is no basis to distinguish 
between active and passive Internet use; all Internet users are immune.  Id. 
104 Id. at 529 (“Plaintiffs are free under section 230 to pursue the originator of a 
defamatory Internet publication.  Any further expansion of liability must await 
Congressional action.”). 
105 See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text (describing immunity granted ISPs); see 
also Eric P. Robinson, Staff Attorney, Media Law Resource Center, Legal Actions and 
Developments Involving Blogs (Sept. 24, 2007), http://www.medialaw.org/ 
bloggerlawsuits (collecting cases). 
106 See supra notes 100, 103 and accompanying text (describing immunity granted ISPs 
and users of Internet services). 
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put a stop to damaging Internet posts, it has not entirely foreclosed the 
ability of plaintiffs to file defamation actions.107 
As a whole, the aforementioned cases provide a very broad grant of 
immunity for ISPs and third party users of their services.108  Although 
the Zeran-Blumenthal-Barrett line of cases provides strong support for the 
continued expansion of immunity, it leaves open liability for the original 
source.109  While this virtual immunity ends almost all concern for large 
companies and third party users, it does not remove the very real threat 
of monetary injury that plagues bloggers, Facebook friends, and other 
denizens of this new Internet.110 
C. The Background and History of Defamation Law and Retraction Strategy 
This Part briefly describes the history of defamation to build a 
framework for analyzing the problems created through the application 
of defamation law to the new Internet medium.111  First, Part II.C 
examines the history and development of defamation law by examining 
common law principles to form a basic framework of defamation law 
and retraction strategy.112  Next, Part II.C highlights judicial attempts to 
resolve Internet defamation suits under the old framework.113  This Part 
endeavors to highlight many of the most important Internet cases to 
date, to describe the legal climate of defamation law on the Internet, to 
bring to light current issues related to defamation liability on the 
Internet, and to lay the groundwork for examining workable future 
solutions.114 
                                                 
107 Barrett, 146 P.3d at 529 (Cal. 2006).  The Barrett court based their opinion upon the fact 
that the defendant did not have any supervisory role in the Internet site, nor was the 
defendant the original source of the allegedly defamatory material; nonetheless, the court 
held that the plaintiffs were free under section 230 to pursue the originator of the Internet 
publication.  Id. 
108 See supra notes 95–104 and accompanying text (discussing the breadth of the CDA and 
the immunity created for ISPs under corresponding case law). 
109 See, e.g., Barrett, 146 P.3d at 529 (upholding the CDA’s grant of immunity to ISPs). 
110 See supra notes 95–97 (discussing the immunity granted ISPs, but withheld from the 
original source). 
111 See infra Part II.C  (discussing problems with applying traditional defamation law 
principles to the Internet). 
112 Infra Part II.C.1 (discussing defamation law at the common law). 
113 Infra Part II.C.2 (discussing a retraction strategy used to mitigate damages at the 
common law). 
114 Infra Part II.C (discussing preeminent case law as it relates to defamation and the 
Internet). 
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1. History and Development of the Law of Defamation 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the inherent right of an 
individual to safeguard his name “reflects no more than our basic 
concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being—a 
concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.”115  In fact, 
even at its inception, defamation law was a remnant of the British crime 
of seditious libel that developed to allow an individual to utilize the 
machinery of the courts to vindicate his good name.116 
From the outset, the eighteenth century Framers of the United States 
Constitution guaranteed the freedoms of press and speech by writing 
these protections into the First Amendment of the Constitution.117  
However, in its earlier jurisprudence, the Supreme Court refused to 
protect the media from defamation lawsuits by relying on the guarantees 
of the First Amendment.118  Instead, defamation law varied from state to 
                                                 
115 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J. concurring); see also THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Cooke ed. 1961) (“It is of great importance in a 
republic, not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers; but to guard one 
part of the society against the injustice of the other part.”). 
116 See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, America on Trial: The Cases that Define Our History 42-
48 (Warner Books 2004) (citing JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND 
TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER 6–7 (Stanley Nider Katz ed., Cambridge:  the Belknap Press of 
Harvard Univ. Press) (1963)).  Perhaps one of the most famous American defamation cases 
occurred in 1734, wherein Zenger, an American newspaperman, was charged by the British 
Crown with the crime of seditious libel for mocking the Royal Governor, a widely detested 
man named Cosby, in the New York Weekly Journal.  Id.  Also of importance in Zenger’s case, 
was the establishment of truth as an absolute defense in defamation actions.  Id. at 45–46. 
(the judge ruled that truth could not be a defense to libel but counsel eloquently persuaded 
the jury that this was the right result)  Presumably, until Zenger’s case, it had never 
mattered much whether the allegedly libelous statements about someone were true or 
false.  Id.  Since the Zenger case and a series of debates on the issue, a person can sue 
successfully for libel only if the defamatory information is proven to be false.  Id. at 48. 
117 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government 
for a redress of grievances.”  Id. 
118 See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 349–50 (1956).  The law of defamation 
did not historically include the principles of free speech and press.  Id.  Instead, defamation 
dealt with the generalized abuses of those rights and with injury to one’s reputation.  Id.  
While the law among the states varied, in the most general sense whenever one person 
communicated information that injured another’s reputation often to incite hatred, 
contempt, ridicule, to otherwise deprive another of respect or cause him to be shunned by 
others, the party defamed had a cause of action against the defamer.  See ROBERT MCEWEN 
& PHILIP LEWIS, GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER 14–15 (7th ed. Sweet and Maxwell Limited 
1974) (1924).  To prove defamation, the plaintiff bore the burden to show only that his 
reputation had been impaired in the eyes of a substantial number of respected community 
members.  HARPER & JAMES, supra, at 350; see also Kimmerle v. N.Y. Evening Journal, 186 
N.E. 217, 217 (N.Y. 1933) (describing strict liability for defamation, “[t]he law of defamation 
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state without the benefit of a single cohesive rule throughout the 
nation.119 
It was not until New York Times Co. v. Sullivan120 that the Supreme 
Court acted upon the inconsistencies of developing defamation law by 
issuing a ruling that recovery for defamation be limited by the First 
Amendment; in short, this proposition revolutionized defamation law in 
the United States.121  The significance of Sullivan rests in the Court’s 
decision to square defamation law more fully with the freedoms of press 
and expression guaranteed by the First Amendment.122  However, the 
Court warned that these protections are not absolute.123  Moreover, the 
                                                                                                             
is concerned only with injuries to one’s reputation[]”).  However, courts soon realized that 
although protecting individuals’ interest in their reputation was important, it must be 
balanced against the important ideals of self-government, for “[w]hatever is added to the 
field of libel is taken from the field of free debate.”  Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 
(D.C. Cir. 1942). 
119 RICHARD LUBUNSKI, LIBEL AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT:  LEGAL HISTORY AND PRACTICE 
IN PRINT AND BROADCASTING 54 (Transaction Books 1987).  “The laws varied not only from 
state to state, but often from case to case within the same state.”  Id. 
120 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
121 Id. at 265–92. (the court determined that states cannot award damages to public 
officials for falsehoods under the First and Fourteenth Amendments without proof of 
“actual malice”).  In Sullivan, the Supreme Court faced the challenge of balancing the 
protection of reputation, the principle of defamation law, against the protection of 
expression.  See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
1008 (Aspen Publishers 2002).  The facts of the case provided that the New York Times ran a 
full-page advertisement entitled “Heed Their Rising Voices,” produced by a group of black 
clergyman in support of the Negro right-to-vote movement and Negro Student movement.  
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256.  Sullivan, the plaintiff and police chief of Montgomery, Alabama, 
brought a defamation suit against the New York Times for the advertisement.  Id.  He alleged 
the newspaper’s advertisement made false accusations that he had harassed black activists.  
Id. at 258.  The Supreme Court held that tort liability recovery for defamation—both libel 
and slander—despite its falsity, is limited by the First Amendment.  Id. at 269.  An 
additional burden rests upon plaintiffs to cure the balance of interests that requires proof 
the defendant acted with actual malice in printing the defamatory material.  Id. at 279–80.  
The Court justified this burden by explaining that defamation is protected speech not fully 
immune from liability.  Id. at 269.  In short, the Court stated, “libel can claim no talismanic 
immunity from constitutional limitations.  It must be measured by standards that satisfy 
the First Amendment.”  Id. 
122 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 121, at 1008.  The author notes the Supreme Court 
has identified several categories of speech that are either unprotected or less protected by 
the First Amendment.  Id. at 952–53.  In these instances the justifications for regulating the 
speech are overshadowed by the value of the expression.  Id. at 953.  The unprotected 
categories of speech include defamation, incitement of illegal activity, fighting words, and 
obscenity.  Id. at 952–53.  Two examples of less protected, or low-value speech, are 
commercial speech and sexually-oriented speech.  Id. at 953. 
123 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80; see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 
245–46 (2000) (placing emphasis on free speech limitations; for example, the First 
Amendment guarantees do not protect defamation, incitement, obscenity or pornography); 
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964) (“[T]he great principles of the Constitution 
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Court concluded that additional limitations and exceptions would be 
necessary to strike a balance between protecting reputation and 
safeguarding First Amendment guarantees.124 
From its humble beginnings, the law of defamation began to flourish 
as the courts imposed exceptions, crafted definitions, and invoked 
certain privileges.125  Today, these early privileges and exceptions have 
carried over to the emerging broadcast mediums of television and radio, 
wherein a libelous broadcast has traditionally been treated as an original 
publication made by the network or broadcast publisher.126  As a result, 
under Sullivan and the Court’s subsequent limitations, defamation 
                                                                                                             
which secure freedom of expression in this area preclude attaching adverse consequences 
to any except the knowing or reckless falsehood.”). 
124 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 121, at 1008 (“Since New York Times, the Supreme 
Court has attempted to strike this balance by developing a complex series of rules that 
depend on the identity of the plaintiff and the nature of the subject matter.”). 
125 Id. at 952 (Chermerinsky inquires as to whether the categorical definitions and 
exceptions developed by the Court are sufficiently specific).  Many of these exceptions, 
while important to the law of defamation, are irrelevant for the purposes of this Note; 
nonetheless, it is worth brief mention that “public figure[s]” have traditionally faced a 
higher burden in defamation suits than “limited purpose public figure[s]” or “private 
figure[s].”  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 121, at 1015.  Sullivan is the preeminent case for the 
“public figure” distinction.  Id. at 1008.  The issue in Sullivan grew out of a split of authority 
between the states on whether public officials were required to prove actual malice prior to 
any recovery.  See E.B. Morris, Annotation, Doctrine of privilege or fair comment as applicable to 
misstatements of fact in publication (or oral communication) relating to public officer or candidate 
for office, 110 A.L.R. 412 (1937).  The majority of states permitted recovery absent malice.  Id. 
at 412–35 (collecting cases).  However, a small majority of states disallowed recovery 
without proof of malice.  Id. at 435–41 (collecting cases).  The minority position laid the 
groundwork for the future of defamation law, including the Court’s revolutionary decision 
in Sullivan.  Id.  Post-Sullivan, an elected official or public figure must prove actual malice 
on the part of the speaker by clear and convincing evidence.  Id. at 412–35.  However, for 
private persons not thrusting themselves into the sphere of public debate the standard is 
lower, and as in the past is set by various state laws, but cannot be strict liability.  See Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344–45 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 375, 391 (1967).  
In addition, a defamatory statement must not be a mere expression of opinion; rather, it 
must be factual in nature or give rise to a factual inference.  Milkovich v. Lorain Journal 
Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1990).  Later, exceptions to this general framework were created.  See 
Morris, supra note 125, at 435–41.  For example, at common law a person committed libel 
each time a defamatory statement was reproduced, meaning either repeated or 
republished, and that person would be subject to the same degree of liability as the first 
publisher.  Id.  Moreover, distributors of written material such as news stands, bookstores, 
and libraries would be found liable only if they knew or had reason to know that the 
content was defamatory.  Id.  Thus, a publisher might be held liable for defamation at the 
common law for unknowingly publishing defamatory material; however, the distributor 
will not be liable unless it knew or had reason to know of untruths in the publication.  Id. 
126 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 121, at 1008. 
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remains the primary remedy against communication excesses in verbal, 
print, and electronic media.127 
2. Prudent Defenses to Defamation Actions—Retraction Statute 
Applicability 
The common law doctrine of unavoidable consequences allows a 
publisher the opportunity to mitigate its damages by submitting to a 
retraction request.128  Under this doctrine, defamatory action is weighed 
against the ability of the victim to avoid or mitigate the harmful effects 
and the gravity of the consequences.129  Consistent with similar damages 
principles in tort law, this doctrine places the burden upon the plaintiff 
in a defamation action to “use such means as are reasonable under the 
circumstances to avoid or minimize the damages.”130 
Practically speaking, the doctrine of unavoidable consequences 
works to protect both publishers and their victims by requiring a fair 
rebuttal and retraction of the defamatory content.131  In effect, the 
doctrine can be both a means of providing restoration of the injured 
party’s reputation and an effective means to mitigate damages caused by 
defendants.132  In this sense, retraction is the most effective means for 
                                                 
127 Id. (noting that the principles of defamation law combined with retraction strategy 
have the potential to provide for reputational repairs through damages and the correction 
of the defamatory statement). 
128 DEFAMATION:  LIBEL AND SLANDER 84 (Theodore R. Kupferman ed., Mecklermedia 
1990).  Retraction originated in a New York case wherein the “court held that a retraction 
afforded ‘proof not only of a disposition to repair the wrong afflicted, but of actual 
reparation to some extent.’”  Id. (citations omitted).  Retraction is a strong defense to 
defamation due to its ability to correct the error by presenting the truth, and thereby 
“showing that plaintiff’s reputation suffered less than claimed.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
129 Donna M. Murasky, Avoidable Consequences in Defamation:  The Common Law Duty to 
Request Retraction, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 167, 174 (1987–88). 
130 C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES 127 (1935).  See also PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW 
OF TORTS § 65, at 458 (Keeton 5th ed. 1984) (noting that the doctrine rests upon the 
“fundamental policy of making recovery depend upon the plaintiff’s proper care for the 
protection of his own interests[]”).  Thus, failure by the plaintiff to request a timely 
retraction of the defamatory publication may result in loss of recovery “to the extent that it 
has been increased by his own unreasonable acts or by his failure to take active steps to 
minimize the loss so long as unreasonable expense or exertion would not be involved.”  Id.  
McCormick, supra, at 130. 
131 Murasky, supra note 129, at 175–76. 
132 Id; see also Mathis v. Cannon, 573 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. 2002), rev’g, 556 S.E.2d 172 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2001) (statute provides that plaintiff in libel action shall not be entitled to any punitive 
damages if defendant corrects and retracts libelous statement, and as a result, all libel 
plaintiffs who intend to seek punitive damages must request retraction or correction before 
filing civil action); Hucko v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 302 N.W.2d 68, 73–74 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1981).  Although some defamation statutes merely codify the common law in providing 
retraction as a mitigating circumstance, others seek to eliminate or condition an award of 
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remedying injury caused by defamatory publication at the earliest 
opportunity.133  Thus, though often under-asserted, the doctrine of 
retraction remains in effect today, and one need look no further than her 
daily paper to view the practical effects of this principle.134 
Today, most retraction statutes relate only to defamatory statements 
published in the broadcast or print media.135  In fact, thirty-one states 
                                                                                                             
damages recovered by a defamed plaintiff.  Hucko, 302 N.W.2d at 73.  In fact, retractions are 
often legislatively awarded.  Id.  The motivation for this enhancement of retractions rests 
not only in the efforts to protect the First Amendment rights of the defendant but also in 
the belief that frequently the best remedy for the defamed plaintiff may be a timely 
correction or retraction of the libelous material.  Id. at 73 n.5. 
133 Murasky, supra note 129, at 175–76. 
134 E.g., James Barron, Need Case:  Just Auction Off a Meteorite, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2007, at 
B3.  The New York Times retracted, stating: 
The article did not adequately emphasize Mr. Pitt’s considerable 
experience in the handling, study and sale of meteorites, or his 
sensitivity to the concerns of the Grand Ronde.  The article should 
have made clear that he was not interested merely in money but also in 
acquiring other extraterrestrial objects, and that his awareness of the 
feelings of the Indians was the reason he had been uneasy about being 
photographed. 
Id.  See generally Craig Silverman, REGRET THE ERROR, http://www.regrettheerror.com/ 
(last visited Oct. 11, 2007) (tracking corrections and retractions in newspapers, magazines, 
broadcast media, and online media). 
135 See infra note 136 (discussing the substance of state retraction statutes).  However, the 
courts have in limited instances broadly defined state retraction statutes to apply to the 
Internet.  Compare It’s In the Cards, Inc. v. Fuschetto, 535 N.W.2d 11, 12 n.1, 14–15 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1995) (reversing a grant of summary judgment based on plaintiff’s failure to request a 
retraction prior to filing suit, as required by the retraction statute which applies to “any 
libelous publication in any newspaper, magazine or periodical[,]” the court determined that 
because the statute predates the Internet it did not apply to Internet postings and the 
legislature must address the growing problems of Internet libel) (emphasis omitted), with 
Mathis, 573 S.E.2d at 385  (stating that a statute which purported to apply to newspapers 
and print media also applied to Internet postings).  The Georgia Supreme Court, in Mathis, 
departed from the plain language interpretation performed by the appellate court, wherein 
the court stated: 
Following the plain language of these statutory provisions, they would 
not appear to be applicable to Internet postings.  First, they 
contemplate actions between an aggrieved party and a newspaper, 
television station, or radio station.  They do not appear to address 
actions between two individuals.  Second, these statutes do not reach 
Internet media such as chat rooms.  The statutes, to the contrary, 
address media which broadcast programs at specific times to specific 
audiences, whereby a retraction would likely be heard by the same 
audience hearing the original defamatory remarks.  To the contrary, 
the audience in a chat room is in a constant state of flux, making the 
remedy envisioned by OCGA § 51-5-12 inapplicable.  Accordingly, the 
trial court did not err in finding that these statutes did not preclude 
Cannon’s claim for punitive damages. 
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have enacted statutes that recognize retraction, correction, or apology for 
defamatory statements as a defense in civil suits alleging defamation, 
libel, or slander.136  Similar to their predecessors, retraction statutes 
                                                                                                             
Mathis v. Cannon, 556 S.E.2d 172, 176 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001), rev'd, 573 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. 2002) 
(citations omitted). 
136 Retraction statutes vary considerably from state to state.  See ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-184 to -
88 (West, Westlaw through End of 2007 Reg. Sess.) (defining publications as “[m]agazines” 
or “newspapers” or any publication that can be mailed through the United States post 
office); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-653.01–.05 (West, Westlaw through End of the Forty-
Eighth Legislature, First Reg. Sess. (2007)) (applies only to “libel in a newspaper or 
magazine, or of a slander by radio or television broadcast”); CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a (West, 
Westlaw through Ch. 256 of 2007 Reg. Sess. urgency legislation) (libel defined as “an[] 
action for damages for the publication of a libel in a newspaper, or of a slander by radio 
broadcast”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-237 (West, Westlaw through the 2007 Jan. Reg. Sess. 
and public acts from the June Sp. Sess. approved by the Gov. on or before June 29, 2007); 
FLA. STAT. § 770.02 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 322 (End) of the 2007 First Reg. Sess. 
and Special B Sess. of the Twentieth Legislature) (applies to newspaper and broadcast 
media); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-11 (West, Westlaw through end of the 2007 Reg. Sess.) (plain 
language of the statute applies only to printed and broadcast media); IDAHO CODE 6-712 
(West, Westlaw through the 2007 First Reg. Sess. of the 59th Legislature, Ch. 369) 
(newspaper, radio or television broadcasts); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-15-3-3 (West, Westlaw 
through end of 2007 1st Reg. Sess.) (newspapers, radio, and television); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§§ 659.2, 659.3, and 659.5 (West, Westlaw through Acts of the 2007 1st Reg. Sess.) 
(“newspaper, free newspaper or shopping guide, or for defamatory statements made on a 
radio or television station”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 411.051, .060–.061 (West, Westlaw 
through end of 2007 legislation) (newspaper, magazine, periodical, radio, and television); 
MAINE REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 153 (West, Westlaw with emergency legislation through Chapter 
466 of the 2007 First Reg. Sess. of the 123rd Legislature); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231 § 93 
(West, Westlaw through Ch. 125 of the 2007 1st Annual Sess.) (publication); MICH . STAT. 
ANN. § 600.2911 (Westlaw through P.A.2007, P.A.2007 No. 1-74, 76, 78-80, 82-84, 86, 87, 89) 
(“newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication or by a radio or television 
broadcast”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.06 (West, Westlaw with laws of the 2007 Reg. Sess. 
effective through July 1, 2007) (newspaper); MISS. CODE ANN. § 95-1-5 (West, Westlaw 
through End of the 2007 Reg. Sess. and 1st Ex. Sess.) (published, broadcast, telecast); MONT. 
CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-818 to -821 (West, Westlaw through the End of 2007 Reg. Sess. and May 
2007 Special Sess.) (“publication in or broadcast on any newspaper, magazine, periodical, 
radio or television station, or cable television system”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-840.01 (West, 
The Statutes and Constitution are Westlaw through the Second Reg. Sess. of the 99th 
Legislature (2006) (any medium); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.336–.338 (West, Westlaw 
through the 2005 73rd Regular Session and the 22nd Special Sess. of the Nevada 
Legislature, statutory and constitutional provisions effective as a result of approval and 
ratification by the voters at the November 2006 General Election, and technical corrections 
received from the Legislative Counsel Bureau (2006)) (“libel in a newspaper, or of a slander 
by radio or television broadcast”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:43-2 (West, Westlaw with laws 
through L.2007, c. 186, and J.R. No. 11) (“newspaper, magazine, periodical, serial or other 
publication in this state”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99-2 (West, Westlaw through S.L. 2007-268 of 
the 2007 Reg. Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-43-02 to -10 (West, Westlaw through the 2007 
Reg. Sess.) (“all publications, including writings, broadcasts, oral communications, 
electronic transmissions, or other forms of transmitting information”); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 2739.03, 2739.13, and 2739.14 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Files 1 through 24 of 
the 127th GA (2007-2008), apv. by 10/7/07, and filed with the Secretary of State by 
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“allow[] a defamation plaintiff to retract, or take back, a defamatory 
statement.”137  Increasingly more often, retraction statutes are effective 
for many defamed individuals merely seeking to have their reputation 
repaired to the extent possible and avoid costly or invasive litigation.138  
Thus, in many instances, “a correction, retraction or apology is often 
adequate[]” to resolve the harm to reputation caused by the defamatory 
statement, when applied with some consistency.139 
3. Inconsistent Application by Courts 
Although defamation law has been easily adapted from newspaper 
and other forms of print media to broadcast media, the Internet has 
presented difficulty in its application due in part to the many players 
involved—including ISPs, hosts, and third-party users—and the ever-
present jurisdictional issues that stem from networked activity.140  There 
are two major cases that clearly present the issue of inconsistency in the 
application of retraction statutes to online defamation.141 
                                                                                                             
10/7/07) (print and broadcast media); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1446a (West, Westlaw 
with chapters of the First Reg. Sess. of the 51st Legislature (2007) (effective September 1, 
2007)) (“newspaper or periodical”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31.210, 31.215 (West, Westlaw 
through End of the 2005 Reg. Sess.) (“newspaper, magazine, other printed periodical, or by 
radio, television or motion pictures”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 20-11-6 to -7 (West, Westlaw 
through the 2007 Reg. Sess. and Supreme Court Rule 06-77) (applies to newspapers, 
television, and radio not liable if one exercises due care); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-24-103 to 
-104 (West, Westlaw through 2007 First Reg. Sess. 2007) (newspaper, periodical, radio, and 
television); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 
2007 Reg. Sess. of the 80th Legislature) (“expressed in written or other graphic form”); 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-1 to -1.5 (West, Westlaw through 2007 First Special Sess.) 
(newspaper, radio, and television); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-48 to -49.1 (West, Westlaw 
through End of 2007 Reg. Sess.) (newspaper, magazines, periodicals, radio, television, and 
Internet); W. VA. CODE § 57-2-4 (West, Westlaw through End of 2007 Second Ex. Sess.) 
(applies to written or spoken words); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 895.05 (West, Westlaw through 
2007 Act 14, published 06/13/07) (newspapers).  
137 First Amendment Center Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.firstamendment 
center.org/Press/faqs.aspx?id=644& (last visited Oct. 8, 2007).  Many statutes provide that 
a plaintiff must make a request for retraction prior to a pre-determined time.  Id.  Then, the 
defendant is given an opportunity to comply within a separate pre-determined time.  Id.  A 
properly executed retraction statute has the effect of mitigating any damages incurred.  Id. 
138 RANDALL P. BEZANSON, LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS:  MYTH AND REALITY 50 (Free Press 
1987) (1985) (reporting that three-fourths of libel litigants who were interviewed and 
questioned about why they brought a lawsuit said they would have been satisfied with a 
correction, retraction, or apology but indicated that they proceeded with a lawsuit because 
they did not receive any of these other resolutions). 
139 Id. 
140 See generally supra Part II.B (discussing the legislatures’ attempts to regulate 
defamatory content on the Internet). 
141 See infra notes 142–54 and accompanying text. 
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In the first case of Cannon v. Mathis,142 Cannon sued Mathis and, to 
defend against punitive damages, Mathis alleged that Cannon’s failure 
to request a retraction precluded any award of punitive damages.143  
According to Mathis, the retraction statute that provided for newspapers 
or other publications should be construed broadly to cover his online 
                                                 
142  573 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. 2002).  In this Internet defamation case, Bruce Mathis, a resident of 
Crisp County, made defamatory postings on an Internet message board asserting a “solid 
waste recovery facility in Crisp County” was unprofitable in its operations.  Id. at 377.  The 
solid waste recovery plant, though state-of-the-art, was never able to live up to the 
expectations of the Crisp County community, and, in fact, was not able to cover its 
expenses from the outset.  Id. at 378.  As a result, Mathis and others created a citizens’ 
rights group, “the Crisp Watchdogs.”  Id. at 379.  The advocacy groups eventually brought 
about a grand jury investigation after a strong collaborative effort to ask critical questions 
at commission meetings and public criticism of the waste management company’s 
operations and finances.  Id.  Later, the grand jury recommended that the waste 
management company increase the availability of information regarding their operations 
and finances to the public.  Id.  After reading the grand jury’s report, Mathis used the 
Internet to voice his opinions and posted three defamatory statements about Chris Cannon, 
an officer and director of Waste Management Services, Inc.  Id.  Mathis’s postings, posted 
under the screen name “duelly41,” stated and implied defamatory facts about Cannon, an 
officer and director of Waste Management Services, Inc., a company who hauled waste to a 
controversial city dump site.  Id.  The messages are as follows: 
[F]irst message, posted at 11:14 p.m., stated: 
what u doing??? 
by: duelly41 
does wwin think they can take our county—stop the trash flow cannon 
we would love u for it—our county not a dumping ground and sorry u 
and lt governor are mad about it—but that is not going to float in crisp 
county—so get out now u thief 
The second message, posted at 11:27 p.m., stated: 
cannon a crook???? 
by: duelly41 
explain to us why us got fired from the calton company please ???? 
want hear your side of the story cannon!!!!!!!! 
The third message, posted at 11:52 p.m., stated: 
cannon a crook 
by: duelly41hey cannon why u got fired from calton company???? why 
does cannon and lt governor mark taylor think that crisp county needs 
to be dumping ground of the south??? u be busted man crawl under a 
rock and hide cannon and poole!!! if u deal with cannon u a crook 
too!!!!!!! so stay out of crisp county and we thank u for it 
Id. 
143 Id. at 383.  The court explained its decision not to award punitive damages as follows:  
Applying our decision to the facts here, we find that Cannon asked the 
Internet service provider Yahoo! to delete the three messages that 
Mathis posted, but did not ask Mathis to correct or retract any of his 
statements.  Because it is undisputed that Cannon did not request a 
correction or retraction in writing before filing his complaint, he is not 
entitled to recover punitive damages from Mathis for any defamatory 
statements posted on the bulletin board on the Internet. 
Id. at 386. 
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message board post.144  Fortunately for Mathis, the court agreed, finding 
“[t]he practical effect of [its] decision is to require all libel plaintiffs who 
intend to seek punitive damages to request a correction or retraction[,]” 
in essence broadening the retraction statute and treating similar 
defendants as such.145  It is unclear what amount of punitive damages 
would have been recognized as a result of this off-the-cuff posting.146  It 
is clear, however, that without a retraction statute, given the sheer size of 
the audience that can be reached on the Internet, unlike newspapers and 
other members of the press, an individual defendant like Mathis, may 
have been subject to overwhelming punitive damages.147  While Mathis 
survived the litigation gauntlet, others may not escape the damaging 
effects of a punitive damages award.148 
                                                 
144 Id. at 385. Specifically, the court stated: 
Our reasons for preferring this broader reading are many.  This 
construction makes the same word mean the same thing in all the libel 
and slander code sections.  It treats a publication for purposes of 
seeking a retraction the same as a publication for purposes of imposing 
liability.  It acknowledges that the legislature extended the retraction 
defense originally created for newspapers, magazines, and periodicals 
to include newspapers and “other publications.”  It encourages 
defamation victims to seek self-help, their first remedy, by “using 
available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and 
thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation.” 
Id. 
145 Id.  First, the Court noted the advantage of having one reading of all the libel and 
slander code sections regardless of medium.  Id.  Second, it acknowledged the legislative 
intent to provide a retraction defense to all publications.  Id.  Third, and most importantly, 
the court noted that the incentive retraction statutes provide for libel victims to seek self-
help.  Id.  By contrast, the dissent disagreed with the majority’s expansive interpretation of 
the retraction statutes.  Id. at 386–87 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).  The dissent honed in on the 
plain language of the statute, contending that if the legislature had intended the retraction 
statute to apply to the Internet it could have done so; instead, however, the legislature 
limited the statutes application to defendants who publish regularly, to allow for 
publication of a retraction in the next issue.  Id. at 388–89.  Thus, the dissent concluded that 
an individual like Mathis, who posted three messages on the Internet, was incapable of 
complying with the retraction statute.  Id. at 389.  The dissent acknowledged, however, that 
the retraction statute may be applicable to an individual who regularly publishes an 
Internet newspaper, magazine, or other publication.  Id.  In its conclusion, the dissent 
stated, “the majority ruling which asks no self-censorship of an Internet poster is 
unconscionable in that it allows Internet users free reign to injure the reputations of others, 
even when the statements cross the bounds of propriety.”  Id. at 389.  The dissent would 
apply defamation laws not in an effort to chill Internet speech, but rather to protect private 
Internet posters, like Mathis, from an Internet that fosters the “poisonous atmosphere of the 
easy lie.”  Id. (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 94 (1966)). 
146 See id. (reversing the judgment of the lower court, holding that awarding damages 
was improper). 
147 See supra note 136 (noting that most state retraction statutes do not provide for 
Internet publications). 
148 See supra Part II.A (explaining the tremendous scope and audience of the Internet). 
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In contrast to the facts of the Cannon case, a recent case from 
Wisconsin unfortunately does not relieve any confusion for Internet 
publishers.149  It’s in the Cards v. Fuschetto grew out of a series of posts on 
SportsNet, an online sports memorabilia website’s bulletin board and 
mailbox feature.150  In It’s in the Cards, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
was faced with determining whether the SportsNet website was a 
periodical under a Wisconsin retraction statute that, like many other 
state statutes, provides relief only for newspapers, magazines, or 
periodicals.151  The court concluded that a SportsNet bulletin board post 
is a random act of communication more closely analogous with a grocery 
store bulletin board rather than a publication.152  The court specifically 
noted the discourse between print and Internet publishing, finding that 
“[a]pplying the present libel laws to cyberspace or computer networks 
entails rewriting statutes that were written to manage physical, printed 
objects, not computer networks or services.”153  Consequently, the court 
                                                 
149 See Electronic Freedom Foundation Bloggers’ FAQ - Online Defamation Law, 
http://w2.eff.org/bloggers/lg/faq-defamation.php (last visited Jan. 25, 2007) (“The 
Bloggers’ FAQ on Online Defamation Law provides an overview of defamation (libel) law, 
including a discussion of the constitutional and statutory privileges that may protect you.”) 
(emphasis added). 
150 535 N.W.2d 11, 12–13 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).  Fuschetto, of Triple Play Collectibles, and 
Meneau, of It’s In the Cards, Inc. collectibles, communicated via the SportsNet bulletin 
board, as well as on the telephone.  Id. at 13.  During these conversations, it was agreed that 
Meneau would visit Fuschetto in New York.  Id. at 13.  After agreeing to the visit, Fuschetto 
and his wife became ill with mononucleosis.  Id.  Consistent with their previous 
conversations, Fuschetto informed Meneau that he had become ill and asked that Meneau 
postpone his trip scheduled for January 1994.  Id.  As a result, Fuschetto and Menau 
exchanged several mailbox conversations in which they and argued about the cost of 
various items that Meneau had purchased:  airline tickets, tickets to a Knicks game, and 
tickets to the David Letterman show.  Id.  While the bulk of this conversation was posted 
using the more personal mailbox function of SportsNet, Fuschetto later posted a message 
using the bulletin board feature, which was easily reached by all subscribers of SportsNet, 
in which he discussed the arguments he had had with Meneau.  Id.  This led Meneau to 
claim that Fuschetto had posted defamatory communications about Meneau on the bulletin 
board.  Id. 
151 Id. at 14.  In order to resolve the meaning of the term “periodical” in the absence of 
any case law on point, the court consulted WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 1680 (Unabr. 1976), which states that a “periodical is defined as  ‘a magazine 
or other publication of which the issues appear at stated or regular intervals.’”  Id.  The 
court concluded that periodicals, based upon this definition, must appear on a regular 
basis—that is, neither infrequent, nor intermittent.  Id.  Furthermore, the court concluded 
that the term is not ambiguous and, therefore, should be given the ordinary meaning 
derived from the aforementioned Webster’s dictionary.  Id. 
152 Id. at 14.  “Writings such as personal letters, billboards and signs are not included; 
therefore, the statute is not inclusive of all forms of alleged libel.”  Id. 
153 Id. 
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called for legislators “to address the increasingly common phenomenon 
of libel and defamation on the information superhighway.”154 
The current status of defamation law on the Internet presents both 
ongoing problems inherited from the aforementioned troubled 
legislative history and new problems emerging from recent, but 
apparently unsuccessful, attempts by courts to remedy the issues 
through judicial interpretation.155  As noted from the start, perhaps the 
most immediately identifiable problems facing the application of 
defamation law to the Internet are solidifying the best practices for 
regulation and also instilling the necessary patience in the legislature to 
listen before they speak.156  The current regulation under the CDA 
essentially leaves online content to the whims of self-regulation and, as 
such, has created an interesting array of self-help remedies without solid 
legal backing.157  The current challenge to the legislatures and the courts 
is, and always has been, to define the appropriate framework for 
correcting cyber wrongs.158 
D. Closing Thoughts 
The current state of law and regulatory methods with regard to the 
new Internet medium have worked to foreclose tangible relief for 
defamation victims by either providing an essentially non-existent legal 
framework or granting sweeping immunity to ISPs.159  But this does not 
have to be the case.160  Clearly, the pull of the various regulatory players, 
including legislatures, courts, and commentators, not to mention the 
Internet’s rapidly changing infrastructure, has created more problems in 
                                                 
154 Id.  “The magnitude of computer networks and the consequent communications 
possibilities were non-existent at the time this statute was enacted.” Id.  See also text 
accompanying note 153 (providing the next sentence in the case). 
155 See supra Parts II.B–C (discussing the enactment of the CDA and the courts’ 
interpretation of its application to ISPs and other Internet users). 
156 See supra Part I (discussing the framework of the Internet and the inherent problems 
with rapidly developing technology). 
157 See supra note 57 (discussing flame wars); infra note 180 (discussing web services that 
seek to repair reparations of defamed internet users). 
158 See infra Part III (discussing the three regulatory methods that have been attempted by 
the legislatures and the courts to resolve this problem, including each method’s 
drawbacks). 
159 See infra Part III.A (discussing the theory behind and the criticism of the self-
regulation approach to the Internet, which the author suggests encompassed the provisions 
of the CDA). 
160 See infra Part V (suggesting that by combining the most effective portions of the 
current regulation approaches, in addition to working with the existing framework created 
by Congress through the enactment of the CDA, the Internet could be regulated to provide 
effective relief for victims of defamatory statements in the online environment). 
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application than successes in achieving any true regulation.161  This Note 
teases apart the preceding discussion to identify and relate three 
categorical approaches previously taken by legislatures, courts, and 
academics, examining each in turn; however, it also pauses to consider 
the potential for overlap and collaboration necessary to the development 
of a more effective and workable solution.162 
III.  ANALYSIS:  COMPARING THREE POTENTIAL APPROACHES TO THE 
REGULATION OF DEFAMATION ACTIONS ON THE INTERNET 
The speed of Internet development and the problems of old law and 
new technology create unique challenges for both the legislatures and 
the courts.163  It is often stated that the law struggles to keep pace with 
technology, and defamation law on the Internet is no exception.164  Each 
change in technology creates new possibilities, and lawyers, courts, and 
legal scholars struggle to deal with its implications.165  The question often 
becomes whether legal frameworks should heed altogether to a 
completely self-regulated system, whether it should give way to a new 
system of cyberlaws for cyberwrongs, or whether the traditional legal 
framework is adequate and should be applied to new technologies, 
including the Internet.166 
This Part analyzes three existing approaches to Internet regulation 
derived from the aforementioned history of the Internet, with an eye 
toward developing a workable framework for Internet defamation cases 
and resolving the current inconsistency in regulatory attempts.167  First, 
Part III.A analyzes self-regulation on the Internet along with its inherent 
problems and limitations, including the current self-regulation-focused 
provisions of the CDA.168  Next, Part III.B evaluates a cyberlaw approach 
that suggests the Internet should retain its own sovereign immunity 
from other jurisdictions’s rules, and the weaknesses associated with this 
                                                 
161 See infra Part III (discussing the criticisms of each approach to Internet content 
regulation). 
162 See infra Part III (categorizing three common methods to Internet regulation and 
discussing the drawbacks that must be addressed in order to begin to provide any tangible 
relief to online defamation victims). 
163 See generally supra note 31 (discussing regulation attempts and the difficulties 
encountered). 
164 See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the treatment of defamatory statements in the online 
environment). 
165 See infra Part III (discussing the three regulatory methods used in relation to the 
Internet and each method’s inherent drawbacks). 
166 See generally supra note 86 (for citations to the leading articles regarding self-help, 
cyberlaws, and traditional law methods). 
167 See infra Part III (analyzing three existing approaches to Internet regulation). 
168 See infra Part III.A (discussing the self-help method). 
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approach.169  Last, Part III.C scrutinizes the application of pre-existing 
legal rules to similar wrongs on the Internet.170  In addition, this Part 
considers the disadvantages associated with contradictory 
interpretations of the applicability of traditional laws to the new Internet 
medium, and attempts to reconcile the current inconsistent application of 
retraction statutes to the Internet.171 
A. Self-Regulation 
Under the first approach, the argument for not regulating the 
Internet is becoming more controversial.172  In fact, in light of failed 
attempts to regulate the Internet, proponents of this approach argue that 
it is better to watch the Internet develop than to promote a hasty 
intervention.173  Moreover, self-regulation is supported by the notion that 
a delay in regulation is appropriate until Internet development slows, its 
effects are plain, and the law can create and apply a proper regulatory 
                                                 
169 See infra Part III.B (discussing the cyberlaws approach). 
170 See infra Part III.C (discussing the traditional laws approach). 
171 See infra Part III.C (providing an analysis of the current inconsistency in retraction 
statute case law as applied to the Internet). 
172 See supra note 30.  See also David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders:  The Rise 
of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1401 (1996).  Commenting on the virtues of 
developing a self-governance system, the authors note: 
 The law of any given place must take into account the special 
characteristics of the space it regulates and the types of persons, places, 
and things found there.  Just as a country's jurisprudence reflects its 
unique historical experience and culture, the law of Cyberspace will 
reflect its special character, which differs markedly from anything 
found in the physical world.  For example, the law of the Net must 
deal with persons who “exist” in Cyberspace only in the form of an e-
mail address and whose purported identity may or may not accurately 
correspond to physical characteristics in the real world.  In fact, an e-
mail address might not even belong to a single person.  Accordingly, if 
Cyberspace law is to recognize the nature of its “subjects,” it cannot 
rest on the same doctrines that give geographically based sovereigns 
jurisdiction over “whole,” locatable, physical persons.  The law of the 
Net must be prepared to deal with persons who manifest themselves 
only by means of a particular ID, user account, or domain name. 
Id. 
173 See, e.g., Keith J. Epstein & Bill Tancer, Enforcement of Use Limitations By Internet 
Services Providers:  “How To Stop That Hacker, Cracker, Spammer, Spoofer, Flamer, Bomber”, 9 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 661, 664 (1997) (suggesting that the existing laws and methods 
of lawmaking are inadequate and too swift; therefore, the Internet should be self-
regulated); Jason Kay, Sexuality, Live Without A Net:  Regulating Obscenity And Indecency On 
The Global Network, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC L.J. 355, 387 (1995) (“Because government regulation 
has been unsuccessful, and self-regulation has succeeded, the Internet should continue to 
be allowed to regulate itself.”). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 3 [2009], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss3/8
2009] Regulating Internet-Based Defamatory Speech 1303 
regime. 174  In addition, many commentators have also suggested that a 
more hands-off approach to the Internet will bolster Internet self-help 
that is said to best prevent the chilling effects that would otherwise result 
from increased regulation.175  First, this Part analyzes the weaknesses of 
the self-regulation approach, highlighting issues and problems with 
baseline assumptions, including the ability, response, and effectiveness 
that are essential to the success of this type of regulation.176  Next, this 
Part examines this theory’s current role as a self-regulatory tool on the 
Internet enacted under the guise of the CDA.177  One of the most 
important drawbacks to the self-regulation approach is its reliance upon 
unprincipled assumptions about Internet actors.178  In short, self-help 
allows rogue agencies and unreasonable individual actors to provide 
essentially unprincipled regulation of the Internet.179  Moreover, this 
                                                 
174 See Hughes, supra note 31, at 365–69 (describing the effect of a no-law Internet and 
determining that it is an understandable, yet flawed, first approach to the borderless 
Internet); see also Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for “Cyberspace,” 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 
993, 1016 (1994) (“The lowest level of self-help is unilateral action by an individual.  We 
might capture the sense of this measure with the phrase ‘if you don’t like it, don’t  
do it.’”). 
175 See supra note 126 and accompanying text (describing the potential chilling effect of 
regulation on Internet speech); see also Chilling Effects, Frequently Asked Questions (and 
Answers) About Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, http://www.chillingeffects.org/ 
faq.cgi#QID76 (last visited Nov. 1, 2007); Dee Pridgen, How Will Consumers Be Protected on 
the Information Superhighway?, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 237, 253 (1997) (“The final avenue 
for consumer protection on the information superhighway is consumer self-help.  Many 
Internet users oppose any and all government regulation[] of cyberspace.  Some may call it 
anarchy, but Internet users label themselves ‘netizens,’ citizens of the Internet world, who 
agree to abide by their own self-imposed rules of ‘netiquette.’”); Stuart Elliott, Clinton 
Advisor Urges Self-Regulation in Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1997 (acknowledging the fear 
that growth of the Internet and digital technology would be hampered if “overregulat[ed], 
overtax[ed] and overcensor[ed]”). 
176 See infra Part III.A (suggesting the notion of whether self-regulation can be effective 
depends upon whether there are parties who are willing and able to take the affirmative 
steps necessary). 
177 See infra Part III.A (discussing the implication of the self-help provisions of the CDA). 
178 See supra Part II.A; see also infra note 180 (discussing the Reputation Defender website).  
It should be noted that along the continuum of regulatory approaches, self-regulation 
represents a simplistic extreme rarely found in the real world.  Id.  Ultimately, self-
regulation depends upon a simple command and control that many participants are 
unwilling to undertake resulting in the unprincipled regulation or exploitation by the few 
willing to take on the responsibility, often to the detriment of the majority.  Id. 
179 See generally supra Part II.A.  See, e.g., ReputationDefender, ReputationDefender > 
About Us, http://www.reputationdefender.com/company (last visited Nov. 8, 2007).  
Founded in 2006, ReputationDefender was created as a response to the “emerging reality of 
the Internet Age” and the erosion of “the line dividing people’s ‘online’ lives from their 
‘offline’ personal and professional lives[.]”  Id.  The site’s purpose is to “find the 
unwelcome online content about you or your loved ones, even if it is buried in websites 
that are not easily examined with standard online search engines.  And if you tell us to do 
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theory rests on the notion that a person defamed online can remedy any 
harm caused by either contacting the blogger or engaging in countering 
the defamatory speech by posting a counter-comment.180  However, the 
success of this argument is based upon the assumption that effective self-
help remedies exist, which essentially means that commentary is 
permitted and requests for removal of content will be honored.181  
Therefore, the extensive reliance on misguided assumptions taken by 
this approach severely diminishes, if not completely eliminates, its useful 
application in cyberspace.182 
In addition, the idea of counter-speech runs the risk of transforming 
into a flame war.183  Speech used in flame wars is often more antagonistic 
                                                                                                             
so, we will work around the clock to get that unwelcome content removed or corrected.”  
Id.  Perhaps most disturbing is their answer to the following FAQ:  “Does 
ReputationDefender simply send cease-and-desist letters or sue everybody when it seeks to 
implement its ‘Destroy’  assistance?” and the corresponding answer,  
No.  Most of our approaches to  assisting in the correction or removal 
of content are non-legal.  We will only pursue legal options with the 
express consent of our clients, and these techniques are strictly 
optional and usually the last resort.  They may incur additional cost.  
In such cases, we do not act as lawyers for our clients.  We are not 
lawyers or a law firm, and we do not offer legal advice or services. 
ReputationDefender, ReputationDefender > Frequently Aasked [sic] Questions, 
http://www.reputationdefender.com/faq (last visited Nov. 8, 2007) (emphasis added). 
180 ReputationDefender, Frequently Aasked [sic] Questions, supra note 179.  The appeal 
of this viewpoint for many is that without any participation by the legal system, there is no 
need to unmask the identity of anonymous bloggers.  See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 464 
(Del. 2005).  However, the need to determine a person’s identity is derived from the 
growing need to repair reputational wrongs in the online environment and dispensing of 
this as a requirement through self-regulation does little to assist in remedying the harm 
caused, which are better addressed through damages and injunctive relief.  Id.  At the heart 
of the self-regulation drawbacks is the notion that the harmful information remains widely 
available and, consequently, continues the harm without any correction.  Id. 
181 See supra note 63 (noting that some blogs and similar websites do not offer an option 
for visitors to comment, which in many ways forecloses a victim’s ability to reach the same 
audience, in a manner similar to the defamatory speech).  
182 See supra note 63 (noting that some blogs and similar websites do not offer an option 
for visitors to comment, which in many ways forecloses a victim’s ability to reach the same 
audience, in a manner similar to the defamatory speech).   
183 See GATTIKER, supra note 57 for a discussion of “flaming” and “flame wars”.  The 
author suggests that flame wars are the result of the self-regulation approaches heavy, and 
merely speculative, assumptions that new Internet users are capable of and willing to 
appropriately regulate their own online affairs.  Id.  To the contrary, flame wars exacerbate 
questions regarding the ability to regulate and the responsibility to regulate that are 
important to the success of this rationale.  Id.  Based on this unprincipled assumption of 
user’s ability to self-regulate, there is little hope that self-regulation will ever be compatible 
with the legitimacy and enforceability required to protect Internet users from defamation 
online.  Id.  
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than useful in countering harmful speech.184  Furthermore, participants 
in flame wars, even if they are not the initial attacker, run the risk of 
creating additional defamatory speech.185  Indeed, counter-speech may in 
fact provide little remedy and defamation victims, unable to obtain 
retractions or removals from the original source, would be left with little 
real remedy other than to rebut the accusations on their own.186  Thus, a 
lack of Internet regulation would provide a greater benefit to would-be 
defendants and extremely low protection, without substantial non-legal 
efforts, to Internet defamation plaintiffs.187 
The CDA provides a modern example of regulations that can be 
categorized aptly as self-help in the area of defamation law; however, 
this Note, as stated previously, concedes that this method fails to 
adequately protect real-life rights in the online environment.188  The CDA 
does not provide a complete bar to defamation suits on the Internet.189  
Instead, the statute bars only plaintiffs who seek relief from the deep 
pockets of ISPs.190  While an ISP is immune, the CDA does not provide 
any immunity from liability for the original poster.191  In fact, the CDA’s 
purpose is to promote self-help on the Internet and prevent the potential 
chilling effect that regulation may have on Internet speech.192  However, 
with a great number of responsible parties potentially judgment-proof 
                                                 
184 See DERY, supra note 57, at 1–2 (describing flame wars as a battle between two online 
users, and noting that speech used in flame wars is often hostile, the author compares their 
contribution to discussion as on par with bathroom graffiti). 
185 See supra note 57 and accompanying text (describing flame wars and their potential 
effects). 
186 See GATTIKER, supra note 57, at 195 (defining flame wars).  The author suggests that 
engaging in flame wars does not effectively repair an individual’s reputation, nor does it 
have the potential to provide any relief in the form of damages.  Id. 
187 See supra Part III.A (discussing one of the non-legal measures Internet defamation 
victims can take).  The effect of self-regulation in the realm of Internet defamation allows 
defendants too much free reign without consequence.  See supra Part III.A.  Defendants are 
not required to take any action to correct a false statement, which runs contrary to the 
expectations established by the common law doctrine of defamation.  See supra Part II.C.1 
(discussing the importance placed upon the ability to safeguard reputation). 
188 See supra note 63 (discussing the difficulty in correcting defamatory speech posted on 
another’s website). 
189 See supra notes 97–99 (discussing how original source liability is not foreclosed by the 
provisions of the CDA which have been interpreted to allow only immunity for ISPs). 
190 See supra notes 97–99 (discussing how original source liability is not foreclosed by the 
provisions of the CDA which have only been interpreted to allow immunity for ISPs).  
However, the author suggests recent case law shows a move toward the imposition of 
injunctive orders on ISPs despite their ever-broadening immunity from liability for 
damages.  See infra Part V. 
191 See, e.g., Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006). 
192 See supra note 176 and accompanying text (describing the chilling effect too much 
regulation may have on the open Internet dialogue enjoyed by so many users today). 
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and foreclosure from recovery by the immunity granted online 
providers, the CDA has created little, if any, tangible recovery for online 
defamation victims through self-help methods.193 
In conclusion, the principal weakness of the self-regulation 
argument is its complete separation from common law doctrines.194  In 
fact, there is little reason to assume that the purpose behind defamation 
laws does not apply to postings on the Internet, just as there is little 
reason to presume that such Internet postings warrant less protection 
than other postings because of the medium involved.195  This approach 
creates “a ‘continuing race of offensive and defensive technologies’s on 
the Internet . . . metaphorical to some and very real to others[] . . . it is a 
race in which no one should expect a final ‘winner.’”196  Indeed, this 
encouragement of bad behavior with little disincentive hardly provides 
even more minimal protection for reputational harms on the Internet 
than a more substantive, legal rules-based approaches might offer.197 
B. Cyberlaws  
A second approach to Internet regulation calls for new cyberlaws in 
cyberspace.198  A cyberlaw approach seeks to address the new medium 
as well as the new types of relationships that exist in cyberspace.199  
                                                 
193 See Hughes, supra note 31, at 1367.  The author suggests that based upon Internet 
demographic information many of the potential defendants to an Internet defamation suit 
are without the means to provide any tangible relief to the victims of their defamatory 
statements.  Id.  Without access to the deeper pockets of Internet ISPs and the nominal relief 
provided to those able to post replies or effectively access the same audience as the original 
message, plaintiffs are left with little available remedy to repair their reputation.  Id. 
194 See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the basic principles behind the law of defamation).   
195 See supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing defamation law as striking a 
necessary balance between the preservation of one’s reputation and the freedom of 
expression). 
196 See Hughes, supra note 31, at 368 (footnote omitted). 
197 See supra Part II.C.2 and accompanying text (discussing common law retraction 
statutes). 
198 See Johnson & Post, supra note 31, at 1367.  See also Manish Lunker, Cyber Laws:  A 
Global Perspective, 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN005846.pdf 
(last visited on Oct. 16, 2008).  The concept of cyberlaw stems from the broad territorial 
reach of the Internet that creates a boundary-less medium and undercuts the “feasibility 
and legitimacy of applying laws based on geographic boundaries.”  Id. (emphasis omitted).  
This perspective suggests the enactment of necessary legislation in all countries for the 
prevention of computer related crime. 
199 See Johnson & Post, supra note 31, at 1367.  In 1996, Johnson and Post characterized the 
virtual world as separate and apart from the “real world[,]” and they added that “[t]his 
new boundary defines a distinct Cyberspace that needs and can create its own law and 
legal institutions.”  Id.  More specifically, the authors viewed the Internet as its own legal 
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Moreover, it recognizes the speed and volume of Internet-facilitated 
cross-border communication that may prevent adequate enforcement 
under existing legal rules.200  However, this theory is largely based upon 
the fact that “[n]o one accidentally strays across the border into 
Cyberspace[,]” and implies the Internet is its own jurisdiction.201  This 
Part explores the basic theory behind the cyberlaw approach and 
provides an examination of its inherent weaknesses relevant to the 
continued discussion of the best practices for the regulation of Internet 
content introduced in Part III.B.202   
A strong argument against early conclusions regarding the need for 
cyberlaws is the seamless intertwinement of everyday life to the Internet, 
likely not considered more than ten years ago.  The Internet has quickly 
crossed the threshold into the real world—technologically, socially, and 
economically.203  Indeed, “[a]s our appliances [have] become ‘smart,’ our 
houses become [increasingly] ‘wired,’ our . . . cable, telephone, and 
Internet services bundle and unbundle,” and with our life events 
“Googled” and “Facebooked,” it becomes increasingly difficult to 
identify cyberspace as a separate and distinct world.204  With the 
significant, and altogether seamless, contributions cyberspace makes in 
our everyday lives, few could be expected to know when they have left 
reality and entered the cyberspace jurisdiction—a picture message? or a 
phone call?205  Likewise, few would expect their rights to be protected 
                                                                                                             
jurisdiction, a new sovereign within which lurked the opportunity to rethink law and 
implement more distinct and rational rules.  Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 1379.  See generally supra Part II.A (discussing the scope of the new Internet 
communities).  The author of this Note suggests that the extent to which this underlying 
principle remains true today is in jeopardy.  See generally supra Part II.A.  With every new 
technological advancement, the line between the two separate and distinct jurisdictions 
envisioned by this approach becomes increasingly blurred.  See generally supra Part II.A.  
Mobile computing has greatly advanced every day tasks to include networked connections 
that take place at the border of each virtual jurisdiction, therefore, as in the case of other 
legislative efforts to develop and enact laws that apply to cyberspace will be both daunting 
and likely plagued by the same inability to keep pace with the technology of the future.  See 
generally supra Part II.A. 
202 See infra Part III.B. 
203 See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the immersion of the Internet into 
entertainment, consumer spending, and popular culture). 
204 See Hughes, supra note 31.  See also supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Internet’s effect on every aspect of our modern lives). 
205 See supra note 7 (the author of this Note comments on the seamless nature of the 
Internet and the increasing inability to separate out non-networked tasks for treatment by 
the common law).  In addition, the author suggests that the creation of different rights to be 
applied in cyberspace would create an even greater incentive to perform tasks in the 
networked environment in an effort to take advantage of an underdeveloped legal 
framework.  See supra note 7.   
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any differently in cyberspace than in other settings. 206  For example, 
when one completes a bank transaction online, would the bank or 
account holder expect that different set of laws will apply to that 
transaction that are distinct from those that apply to their transactions in 
local bank branches?207  No, and similarly, no one would expect 
defamation law to treat postings on a school message board or locker in 
a particular state to be treated any differently than a posting on a virtual 
message board or blog from a computer in the same state.208 
C. Traditional Legal Frameworks 
The third approach to Internet regulation, proposing the use of 
traditional legal principles, suggests that the Internet should be treated 
no differently than previous telecommunications technology, such as 
Morse code or the telephone.209  The Internet does not foreclose the 
application of pre-existing laws; something unlawful, regulated, or 
licensed does not become lawful, unregulated, and unlicensed merely 
because it occurs on the Internet.210  Though faster and more 
comprehensive, the Internet still involves communication between 
individuals over distances.211  Consequently, existing legal rules can be 
applied to the Internet.212  However, there exists an interpretive concern 
                                                 
206 See Hughes, supra note 31, at 371 (making similar comparisons and conclusion in the 
area of online securities). 
207 Id. 
208 Id.; see also Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.  1145, 1147 
(2000) (noting that “‘cyberlaw,’ or the ‘law of the Internet,’” does not usefully exist.  “Very 
few bodies of law are defined by their characteristic technologies.  Tort law is not ‘the law 
of the automobile,’ even though the auto accident is the paradigmatic tort case.  Nor is 
urban zoning ‘the law of the elevator.’”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the 
Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207 (announcing that there was no more a “law of cyberspace” 
than there was a “Law of the Horse”). 
209 Id.  See also ANNA MANCINI, INTERNET JUSTICE:  PHILOSOPHY OF THE LAW FOR THE 
VIRTUAL WORLD 76 (Buenos Books Americas LLC 2005).  Mancini concludes that law and 
philosophy were conceived for a material economic world driven by scarcity and 
territoriality.  Id. at 75–80.  Without the criterion of territoriality, the dominant philosophies 
of law in the virtual world may be left bankrupt.  Id.  This is especially the case in pure 
theories of law, in which the territoriality criterion is the cornerstone.  Id.  Mancini proposes 
a philosophy of justice that is suited to the virtual world and would involve mapping 
traditional legal principles into international laws to cure territoriality issues that plague 
the Internet’s development.  Id. 
210 Id. 
211 See supra Part II.A (discussing the various forms of Internet communication that at 
their core simply allow individuals to reach and connect with others quickly over 
substantially large distances). 
212 See supra Part II.A (discussing the various forms of Internet communication that at its 
core simply allow individuals to reach and connect with others quickly over substantially 
large distances).  
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in this area wherein traditional legal principles have been applied 
inconsistently, particularly in the area of defamation law and retraction 
strategy.213  Therefore, unlike the discussion of the flaws of a particular 
method in Parts III.A–B, this Part instead analyzes the inconsistent 
approach taken by the courts as a drawback to the application of 
traditional laws in Internet defamation cases.214 
The uncertainty of the courts in both the Cannon and It’s in the Cards 
Internet defamation lawsuits demonstrates that concerns regarding the 
application of traditional laws to the Internet are not merely 
theoretical.215  In one instance, courts will protect individual Internet 
posters the same as their print and broadcast publishing counterparts,216 
but, as the second instance demonstrates, this may not always be the 
case.217  Indeed, in many jurisdictions, retraction statutes do not extend 
to Internet publishing but instead make explicit reference to the 
statutes’s application to print and broadcast media.218  Therein lies the 
inconsistency in the application of traditional defamation law that must 
be reconciled—should retraction statutes apply to the Internet?219  In 
other words, are the statutes’s purposes and references broad enough to 
include online communications and flexible enough to work with 
existing laws?220 
Based on the substance of the preceding analysis, the inconsistency 
in the courts’s application of traditional retraction statutes in Cannon and 
It’s in the Cards may be reconciled by examining the reasoning employed 
by each court.221  In Cannon, the court explained that its decision to 
prohibit the plaintiff from collecting punitive damages was due to the 
                                                 
213 See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the holding in Cannon which permitted the application 
of retraction statutes and the courts refusal to allow application of retraction statutes to 
Internet publications in It’s in the Cards). 
214 See infra Part III.C. 
215 See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the holding in Cannon, which held that traditional 
retraction laws also applied to the Internet, and the holding in It’s in the Cards, which held 
traditional retraction laws do not apply to the Internet). 
216 See supra Part II.C.2. 
217 See supra Part II.C.2. 
218 See supra note 136 (discussing the various retraction statutes within the United States).  
In addition, some state defamation laws require that a retraction be requested prior to 
conferring any right to sue for defamation to the plaintiff.  See, e.g., Mathis v Cannon, 573 
S.E.2d 376, 383 (2002) (holding that “OCGA § 51-5-11, the state retraction statute, provides 
that a plaintiff in any libel action shall not be entitled to any punitive damages if the 
defendant corrects and retracts the libelous statement ‘in a regular issue of the newspaper 
or other publication in question’ after receiving a written demand[]”). 
219 See infra Part IV. 
220 See infra Part IV. 
221 See supra Part II.C.3 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and holding of both 
the Cannon and It’s in the Cards decisions). 
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plaintiff’s failure to request a retraction.222  Indeed, in explaining its 
decision to prohibit the plaintiff from collecting punitive damages for 
failure to request a retraction, the court hoped to “encourage[] 
defamation victims to seek self-help, their first remedy, by ‘using 
available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and 
thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation.’”223  The court, in 
encouraging the use of traditional defamation remedies in tandem with 
the notion of self-help remedies in cyberspace, hoped to “strike[] a 
balance in favor of ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate in an age 
of communications when ‘anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to 
the Internet’ can address a worldwide audience of readers in 
cyberspace.”224  By contrast, as previously discussed, the Court in It’s in 
the Cards, rejected the application of traditional legal principles to 
cyberspace and called for the legislatures to enact new cyberlaws for the 
treatment of defamation on the Internet.225 
At its core, the inconsistency between the following two cases can be 
attributed to, and resolved as, a conflict among regulatory methods.226  
In Cannon, the court pushed the use of traditional retraction statutes as a 
method for self-help, pulling together both the traditional law approach 
and the underlying self-help purpose of section 230.227  However, in It’s 
in the Cards, the court resorted to the previously discussed cyberlaws 
approach, calling for the legislature to enact laws that apply to the 
Internet and provide greater recognition of its unique characteristics.228  
In Cannon, the plaintiff was allowed recovery for the injury to his 
reputation, and to the contrary, in It’s in the Cards, the plaintiff was 
denied recovery despite an extensive and well-developed body of 
common law defamation principles.229  Thus, a rejection of the traditional 
                                                 
222 See supra note 145 (describing the underlying reasons the court read the state 
retraction statute broadly to apply to all defamatory statements, including those by Mathis 
in his message board posting). 
223 See Cannon v. Mathis, 573 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. 2002) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974)).  
224 See Cannon v. Mathis, 573 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. 2002) (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 
851–53 (1997)); see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). 
225 See supra note 154 and accompanying text (explaining the refusal by the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals to apply present libel law to cyberspace). 
226 See supra Part III.A (discussing three regulatory methods that have been applied to the 
Internet). 
227 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
228 See supra notes 151–54 and accompanying text. 
229 See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing the facts of both Cannon and It’s in the Cards). 
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law approach by the courts may yield perverse results in determining 
plaintiffs’ recovery.230 
The inherent problems with the self-regulation and cyberlaw 
approach and, in addition, the perverse results reached by the courts’s 
inconsistent application of traditional defamation principles to the 
Internet have created both persistent and emerging problems.231  As 
noted at the outset of this analysis, a workable solution is necessary to 
prevent the perverse effects of the current state of the law that deprives 
plaintiffs of any meaningful recovery for their injuries, and defendants of 
an opportunity to mitigate their damages.232 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION:  PERSISTENT PROBLEMS, EMERGING PROBLEMS, AND 
MODEST RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A LASTING SOLUTION 
Internet defamation jurisprudence is in general inconsistent, and 
many of the solutions proposed do not adequately track the primary 
goals of defamation actions, as discussed above, to provide vindication 
for one’s good name.233  The inconsistent Internet defamation principles 
stem from two competing interests.  On the one hand, the interest is in 
preserving the free flow of communication on the Internet.  The lack of 
regulation and the broad grant of section 230 immunity preclude many 
sources of online speech from liability for defamation in furtherance of 
this interest.234  On the other hand, this first interest competes with the 
interest that victims of defamatory speech have in the vindication of their 
good name and other remedies.  Taking this basic conflict into account, 
this Note recognizes the proper solution may require the law to take the 
middle ground—seeking a solution that allows cybertort defendants to 
mitigate their damages and provides incentives for correction, which 
may incidentally improve plaintiffs’ abilities to receive some redress for 
their injuries. 
                                                 
230 Furthermore, the author suggests that the duplication of the court’s decision in It’s in 
the Cards or, alternatively, the legislature’s failure to broaden existing retraction statutes 
may deny victims any chance of recovery under the traditional law approach.  See supra 
note 137 (discussing the substance of state retraction statutes).  Moreover, many states 
require that a plaintiff first demand a retraction prior to instituting an action for defamation 
that would further deny plaintiffs any meaningful recovery if the reasoning employed by 
the court in It’s in the Cards is followed.  See supra note 137. 
231 See supra Part III (discussing the drawbacks and inconsistency in the current 
regulatory approaches to Internet defamation). 
232 See infra Part V (discussing the author’s mid-ground solution to the drawbacks and 
inconsistency that have prevented plaintiffs from meaningful recovery for cyberwrongs). 
233 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
234 See supra notes 97–104 (discussing the broad grant of immunity given ISPs under 
section 230 and the courts later interpretations). 
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Thus, this Part first briefly discusses the existing self-help provisions 
of section 230 and, subsequently, proposes and examines the benefits of a 
broad interpretation of traditional retraction statutes as an effective but 
modest approach that has the ability to work in tandem with this 
existing framework.235  Prior to this discussion, it is conceded that this 
imperfect solution is not an answer that completely preserves either the 
interest in the preservation of speech, or, for that matter, the interest of 
persons harmed by defamatory online speech.  Nevertheless, this 
solution creates a better balance of the conflicting interests at stake by 
providing the backing of a strong common law legal framework that has 
survived the prior innovations of radio and broadcast media, without 
resorting to drastic legal changes or less-than-effective inaction. 
Under section 230, the current self-help model, ISPs are immune 
from liability in damages for defamatory content posted on their 
websites.236  Despite the criticism in recent years to upend this Zeran-
Blumenthal-Barrett interpretation of section 230, the courts’ interpretation 
has instead extended the immunity granted and, as a result, parties 
defamed online have both retained formidable obstacles that must be 
overcome in seeking legal recourse and become the subject of ineffective 
self-help remedies.237 
The Zeran-Blumenthal-Barrett interpretation continues to engage 
courts in the practice of denying victims of libelous speech any recourse 
in favor of the CDA’s purpose of encouraging self-governance in the 
online environment.238  In effect, Congress and the courts have 
underlined the notion that parties harmed by defamatory online speech 
can readily respond because the barriers to entry remain low, and 
                                                 
235 While a number of the provisions of the CDA were determined unconstitutional by 
the Supreme Court, the CDA remains a barrier to both further regulation and relief in 
online defamation lawsuits.  See supra Part II.B.2.  Therefore, the author suggests that any 
meaningful regulatory solution for this type of cyberwrong must take into account the 
limitations created by the CDA.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
236 See generally supra Part II.B.  See also Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trustees of 
Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 561 (E.D. Va. 1998) (suggesting that section 
230 provides immunity from actions for damages but does not provide immunity for 
actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief).  If retraction statutes are broadened to 
cover Internet content, then this proposed solution would be the most effective solution in 
providing relief despite the immunity granted by the CDA.  Id.  In fact, if ISPs are subject to 
declaratory and injunctive relief, retraction statutes would allow demands for retraction to 
be made to the ISPs directly.  Id.  While many commentators have undertaken an extensive 
search to find ways in which ISPs can be engaged to regulate the Internet, this solution 
would accomplish that task in the area of defamation law.  Id. 
237 See generally supra Part IV (analyzing the various approaches to Internet regulation). 
238 See supra Part II.B (discussing the Zeran-Blumenthal-Barrett interpretation of the 
provisions of the CDA). 
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significant technological ability is no longer needed.239  Thus, while 
online content providers revel in the immunity granted under section 
230, this approach alone neither repairs, nor prevents, the harm caused 
to victims of defamatory online speech. 
However, despite the limitations created by the courts’ interpretation 
of the CDA provisions, the legislature and the courts can tip the balance 
of interests in favor of providing plaintiffs adequate relief for damage 
caused to their reputation.  By applying section 230 in tandem with 
traditional retraction statutes, this Note suggests that courts may be able 
to give legal effect to existing self-help remedies in the online 
environment. 
While some interpretations of section 230 have merely protected the 
interests of online content providers, the additional self-help protections 
instructed by Cannon’s application of traditional retraction laws to the 
Internet create a workable solution for victims of online defamation.  
This solution both empowers defamed parties with the force of law and 
creates a cost-effective way for online speakers to minimize their 
liability.  First, with the adoption of retraction statutes applicable to the 
Internet, a publisher of defamatory speech would be required to act, 
allowing for both recognition that the speech is harmful and for some 
vindication of an Internet defamation victim’s reputation.  Although it is 
still open to debate whether a retraction is sufficient to redress the 
wrong, the increased risk of judgment-proof defendants online may 
make retraction the best option toward receiving any relief, even if it is 
only minimal.  Moreover, cyberspace as a low-cost medium allows for 
greater ease in retracting harmful speech online.  Finally, it traces the 
beneficial bricks-and-mortar principles developed for the mitigation of 
damages incurred by Internet defendants sued for harmful speech and 
lessens the chilling effects associated with the cost of aversion. 
In addition, retraction statutes may impose a minimal duty upon 
ISPs to respond if failure to do so would affect the plaintiff’s ability to 
bring their lawsuit.240  Under the current CDA model for immunity, ISPs 
are immune from damages and have yet to be held liable in actions for 
declaratory or injunctive relief.241  Thus, this solution provides legal 
means to engage ISPs despite their long history of immunity from 
actions for damages.  Moreover, this Note recognizes that applying 
                                                 
239 See supra notes 6–9 (discussing the demographics of Internet users); see also supra Part 
II.A.2 (discussing the ability for a large range of users to become Internet publishers given 
the accessibility and increasingly easy to use software applications). 
240 See supra note 137 (stating that some defamation actions cannot be brought until a 
retraction is first requested). 
241 See Mainstream Loudoun, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 561 (holding that ISPs are only immune 
from actions for damages under section 230). 
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retraction statutes in tandem with the CDA will provide necessary legal 
backing to the spirit of self-help, while recognizing that it is not a perfect 
solution to redressing the harm experienced by victims of defamatory 
speech.  Nevertheless, this union brings greater balance to the interests of 
robust and wide-open debate online and redressing the harm felt by 
victims of online defamation. 
Finally, this middle-ground approach carries with it the potential to 
engage ISPs, a solution that ultimately benefits both online speakers 
through the mitigation of punitive damages and those whom they 
defame by providing some retribution for their injury.  Until the true 
implications of the Internet are realized in the years to come, this 
solution will provide the necessary relief from online defamation and 
offers an excellent alternative to hasty, comprehensive regulations. 
The solution to the problem of defamatory online speech, given the 
diverse attempts to regulate the Internet that have created an uneasy 
landscape for further development, is not an easy one, but the timing is 
ripe for continued development of regulations.  Currently, the state of 
Internet law remains at a juncture where hasty self-help legislation, not 
unlike the CDA, has created rights and immunities likely to continue to 
evolve.  Moreover, the nature of this quickly expanding technology, 
although it has produced cries for reformation, is unlikely to be 
adequately served by a resort to the development of comprehensive 
legislation.  This middle-ground solution—expanding the reach of 
retraction statutes developed at common law—though not without its 
flaws, seems plausible as a long-term solution to some of the current 
problems.  Most importantly, this approach balances competing 
interests, utilizing existing regulatory frameworks and greater efficiency, 
flexibility, and predictability associated with traditional laws. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Internet defamation highlights the conflict between the rights of 
individuals to speak freely and the need of those individuals to protect 
their reputation.  As the Internet continues to expand its reach 
technologically, socially, and economically, the problem of Internet 
defamation will no doubt continue.  The consistent changes in the 
Internet’s breadth and scope as a primary communication medium, 
including changes to its regulatory structure, pose serious questions as to 
the best practices for regulating this new online jurisdiction.  Moreover, 
in this new environment, the protection of both free speech rights and 
individual reputations will require more vigilance on behalf of the courts 
and legislatures.  However, until a comprehensive solution is reached, 
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the current self-help provisions of the CDA working alongside common 
law retraction statutes can provide a modest and effective solution. 
As the hypothetical lawsuit presented in Part I reveals, self-help 
alone is not an effective alternative for individuals defamed online.  As 
discussed, the common law retraction strategy developed with the intent 
to protect individuals and relieve misguided defendants from punitive 
damages.  This principle has survived newspapers, radio, and broadcast 
television, and there is no reason to suggest it cannot do the same for the 
Internet.  Working in tandem with the CDA’s self-help purpose, a broad 
interpretation of state retraction statutes could provide the hypothetical 
law student discussed in Part I with the means necessary to engage ISPs 
and website owners, as well as users, to provide a true remedy for the 
harm caused. 
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